Restructuring the Bankruptcy System: A Strategic Response to Stern V. Marshall by Gotberg, Brook E.
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications
Spring 2013
Restructuring the Bankruptcy System: A Strategic
Response to Stern V. Marshall
Brook E. Gotberg
University of Missouri School of Law, gotbergb@missouri.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/facpubs
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Brook E. Gotberg, Restructuring the Bankruptcy System: A Strategic Response Tostern v. Marshall, 87 Am. Bankr. L.J. 191 (2013)
Restructuring the Bankruptcy System:





The Supreme Court's ruling in Stern v. Marshall has signaled a need to
alter the bankruptcy courts' jurisdictional structure. In Stern, the Supreme
Court ruled that bankruptcy judges, who lack the life tenure and salary protec-
tions provided by Article III, cannot issue final rulings in bankruptcy proceed-
ings previously believed to be within their core jurisdiction. In response to the
constitutional challenge raised by Stern, and in recognition that bankruptcy
court's jurisdictional limits represent a long-standing problem, many argue for a
long-term solution: the restructuring of the system to create specialized Article
III bankruptcy courts.
This article evaluates this proposal in light of classic principles of system
restructuring, namely, that any proposed restructure should stem from the un-
derlying goals or strategy for that system. The creation of a specialized Article
III bankruptcy court is consistent with the view of bankruptcy as a method of
distribution, but not with bankruptcy as a procedural mechanism to deal with
collective default. In recognition of this tension, the article promotes an alterna-
tive solution to the Stern problem, one that harmonizes other strategic ap-
proaches and promotes uniformity in bankruptcy. This solution would replace
bankruptcy courts with an administrative agency subject to the review of non-
specialized district courts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Through its recent decision Stern v. Marshall,' the Supreme Court has
chiseled a crack in the constitutional foundation of the bankruptcy system
that may result in a wholesale erosion of bankruptcy judges' jurisdictional
'Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 180 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2011), rehg denied, 132 S. Ct. 56, 180 L. Ed. 2d
924 (2011).
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authority.2 In Stern, the Court concluded that although bankruptcy judges
had the statutory authority to enter final judgments on a debtor's counter-
claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), the very grant of this authority
violated Article III of the Constitution.3 As the Court explained, bank-
ruptcy judges who lack the Article III protections of lifetime tenure and sal-
ary protection cannot exercise the "judicial Power of the United States,"
which the Court held is necessarily invoked when a federal court acts to
resolve claims under state law.4 Based on its striking similarity to a thirty-
year old Supreme Court decision, Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Mar-
athon Pipe Line Co. ("Marathon"),5 the ruling seemed a long overdue criti-
cism of Congress' failed efforts to resolve constitutional concerns about
bankruptcy courts when such concerns first arose in 1978. The decision in
Stern also served to reinforce arguments, many of which predated Marathon,
that the only sensible way to organize a federal bankruptcy system driven by
litigation was to appoint bankruptcy judges with lifetime tenure under Arti-
cle III. These arguments for an Article III bankruptcy court have thus far
dominated the academic literature; generally speaking, proposed restructuring
solutions presuppose that a system of specialized bankruptcy judges is neces-
sary and desirable.6
Arguments for an Article III bankruptcy court arose most prominently
during the late 1970s, when the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which
created the Bankruptcy Code in use today, was being drafted. As part of a
shift towards greater responsibility for bankruptcy judges, formerly termed
2See Jonathan Azoff & Thomas Szaniawski, Stern v. Marshall and the Limits of Consent, 30 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 28 (2011) ("Early reactions from the bankruptcy bar suggest that the decision's effects - at
least initially - may be widespread and controversial."); Michael St. Patrick Baxter, et al., The Scope and
Implications of Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), 4 (Oct. 26, 2011) (unpublished report), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1979503 (noting that the Court's rationale for its decision permits a broader
reading that calls into question the constitutional validity of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over a
range of core proceedings); Eric G. Behrens, Stern v. Marshall: The Supreme Court's Continuing Erosion of
Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction and Article I Courts, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 387, 388 (2011) ("the practical
impact of these decisions is . . . to invalidate powers that bankruptcy judges and their predecessors have
exercised since 1800"); Susan Block-Lieb, What Congress Had To Say: Legislative History as a Rehearsal of
Congressional Response to Stern v. Marshall, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 55, 57 (2012) ("The Supreme Court's
decision in Stern has been even more shocking to the bankruptcy bar than its earlier decision in Northern
Pipeline."); Richard Lieb, The Supreme Court, in Stern v. Marshall, by Applying Article III of the Constitu-
tion Further Limited the Statutory Authority of Bankruptcy Courts to Issue Final Orders, 20 J. BANKR. L. &
PRAc. 4 Art. 1 (Sept. 2011); Mark S. Scarberry, The Supreme Court's Decision in Stern v. Marshall:
Analysis &Implications (Pepperdine Univ. Legal Stud., Research Paper No. 14, 2011), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1888685 ("[T]he entire bankruptcy court system remains
somewhat vulnerable.").
3Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608.
41d. at 2609.
sN. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
6See Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administra-
tion, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384, 389 (2012), discussed infra.
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referees" of the district court, a significant contingent of academics and bank-
ruptcy professionals pushed for the appointment of bankruptcy judges with
life tenure and salary protection. Arguments focused on the growing number
of bankruptcy cases, the inability of the federal judicial system to effectively
review them all, and the advantage that specially trained bankruptcy judges
could bring to the system by way of swift and efficient adjudication. Regret-
tably for advocates of this Article III solution, the specialization of the bank-
ruptcy courts proved to be an insurmountable obstacle to obtaining Article
III status for bankruptcy judges, as many, including the general federal bench,
indicated their strong opposition to such a specialized trial court in the fed-
eral system.7 Instead, the Bankruptcy Code gave bankruptcy judges all the
authority of district court judges in bankruptcy, but without Article III
status.
The constitutional status of bankruptcy court judges and their authority
over bankruptcy cases has been a subject of debate ever since. After the
Bankruptcy Code was challenged by the Supreme Court's ruling in Mara-
thon, and sporadically in the intervening years between Marathon and Stern,
individuals writing on the topic continued to recommend appointment of
bankruptcy judges under Article III.8 In 1997 the National Bankruptcy Re-
view Commission9 also recommended bankruptcy courts be established
under Article III as a way of creating a "constitutionally sound structure"
that would "eliminate costly litigation over bankruptcy court authority."t0
In spite of these recommendations, appointment of bankruptcy judges to
Article III has proved to be a non-starter in Congress, despite its strong
support among many bankruptcy scholars. This reluctance to take up the
issue probably reflects some simple inertia, but it also demonstrates legitimate
opposition to an Article III bankruptcy bench.
Opposition to Article III bankruptcy courts can be explained on ideologi-
cal grounds. Proponents and opponents of the Article III solution have dif-
fering opinions regarding bankruptcy's place in the federal system,
7See Prepared Statement of Spencer M. Williams, Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.
Decision: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 36-37
(1983) ('[W]hile specialization may have a place in many State trial court systems and even, in rare
instances, in the Federal appellate area or the administrative law area, we believe it should remain as much
an 'exception to the rule' in our Federal trial court system in the future as it has been in the past."
(emphasis in original)).
'See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, The Costs of A Non-Article III Bankruptcy Court System, 72 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 529, 566 (1998); G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. et. al., Review of the Proposals of the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission Pertaining to Business Bankruptcies: Part One, 53 Bus. LAW. 1381, 1440 (1998); George W.
Kuney, Stern v. Marshall: A Likely Return to the Bankruptcy Act's Summary/Plenary Distinction in Article
III Terms, 21 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 1, 9-10 (2012).
'Established pursuant to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106,
and operating until November 19, 1997.
10 NAT'L BANKR. REV. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 721 (1997).
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particularly the advisability of a distinct system of policies, rules, and treat-
ment for debtors, creditors, and third parties. This disagreement regarding
the ideological basis for bankruptcy law translates into a disagreement over
the ideal structure for the bankruptcy system. Those who view bankruptcy
as more of a minimalist procedural structure intended to mirror nonban-
kruptcy law except as necessary to deal with collective default, often
termed" "proceduralists,"12 are particularly disinclined to support a special-
ized Article III bankruptcy court by virtue of their ideology. They stand in
direct opposition to those who view bankruptcy as a mode of implementing
distributional policy, referred to as "traditionalists," s whose ideology favors
an Article III bankruptcy court.
More specifically, specialized bankruptcy courts work to the advantage of
traditionalists, who see bankruptcy as an opportunity to establish distribu-
tive policy distinct to cases of insolvency. This policy would take into con-
sideration factors that are otherwise ignored in the course of debt collection,
such as the impact that debt and collection have on third parties. Particu-
larly in the case of business reorganization, traditionalists promote the influ-
ence of a bankruptcy judge, a third-party arbiter with a specialized
knowledge of bankruptcy procedure, who can assist a struggling debtor in its
efforts to regroup and emerge from bankruptcy a profitable venture, thereby
saving the jobs of employees and preventing the death of factory towns.
On the other hand, specialized bankruptcy courts do nothing for
proceduralists, who view bankruptcy as a procedural mechanism for debt re-
covery in the face of collective default. In their view, there should be no
"As Douglas Baird has acknowledged, "Sorting legal scholars into distinct camps is a dangerous busi-
ness. Successful academics have views that are too complex and too modulated to be rigidly categorized."
Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE LJ. 573, 576 (1998). Ascribing uniform
views to scholars within distinct camps is even more dangerous; I do so merely for purposes of simplicity
in analysis, recognizing that generalizations may quickly break down when one examines the specifics of
any particular argument.
2See, e.g., id.; Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to War-
ren, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 815 (1987); Richard M. Hynes, Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy?, 56 ALA. L. REV.
121 (2004); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91
YALE L.J. 857 (1982); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy As
(Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 931 (2004).
"See, e.g., KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 19
(1997) (advocating consideration of the community in considering bankruptcy policy); Donald R.
Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 722 (1991);
JANIS SARRA, CREDITOR RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: RESTRUCTURING INSOLVENT CORPORA-
TIONS 3 (2003); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987); William C. Whit-
ford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer
Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397 (1994). They may also be termed 'practical-
ists." See also Adam J. Levitin, Toward A Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking in A
Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. LJ. 1, 4 (2006).
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difference in treatment of creditors (or more broadly, "rightsholders")14
whether in or out of bankruptcy, except as necessary to deal with the fact
that there are multiple creditors simultaneously looking for relief. Apart from
facilitating a "creditors' bargain," whereby the collective interest of creditors
can be maximized, bankruptcy should play no role in altering the course of
nonbankruptcy law. A specialized judge, especially one imbued with author-
ity to exer'cise independent judgment on the disposition of a firm and the
rights of creditors, is counter to this interest.
Consideration of underlying strategic goals for bankruptcy, such as those
expressed by both the traditionalists and the proceduralists, is essential when
considering a holistic restructuring of the bankruptcy system, as advocated in
the wake of Stern. Thus far, the academic literature has been largely focused
on the historical account of bankruptcy courts and bankruptcy judges, draw-
ing conclusions based on that historical description that Article III status is
or is not required.15 There has been some analysis approaching the topic
from a strategic viewpoint on the proceduralist side, but usually for the pur-
poses of suggesting alterations to substantive bankruptcy law,16 or to rein-
force the proceduralist view that issues of debt collection should not be seen
as "bankruptcy" issues.17 This paper is the first to apply strategic principles
for the direct purpose of facilitating a workable restructure of the bankruptcy
system.
In accomplishing this, the article first analyzes the strategic principles of
distributional policy and consistency between bankruptcy and non-bank-
ruptcy law set forth by traditionalists and proceduralists, and considers how
those strategic principles would translate into proposals for structural reform.
It then sets forth an independent strategic principal, that of uniformity in
bankruptcy, that it argues should be the strategic basis for restructuring the
bankruptcy system. The article proposes a solution responsive to the goal of
uniformity: the creation of an executive agency to administer the bulk of
bankruptcy filings, with a predetermined category of cases channeled directly
to standard, non-specialized federal district courts.18 Together, the agency
'
4 Mooney, supra note 12, at 934 .
"See, e.g., Block-Lieb, supra note 2, at 117; Joan N. Feeney, Statement to the House of Representatives
judiciary Committee on the Impact of Stern v. Marshall, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 357, 400 (2012); Thomas E.
Plank, Why Bankruptcy Judges Need Not and Should Not Be Article III judges, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 567,
572 (1998).
"See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 147
(1986); Mooney, supra note 13, at 1011-12 (2004).
iSee Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 174 (1987);
Hynes, supra note 12, at 124 ("The central question addressed by this Article is why we offer substan-
tially more, or at least different, debt relief in our bankruptcy system than we offer under non-bankruptcy
law.")
"Currently, all Article III federal district courts are generalist courts, with jurisdiction over cases and
controversies as laid out in 28 U.S.C. § 1330 et seq. The only exception is the Court of International
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and the district courts would manage the caseload currently carried by the
bankruptcy courts. Recognizing the strategic concerns of the traditionalist
and proceduralist camps, this solution draws important considerations from
both while simultaneously pursuing uniformity in the bankruptcy system and
putting bankruptcy procedure in greater conformity with the larger federal
system.
Using an administrative agency would encourage the resolution of the
vast majority of bankruptcy cases according to carefully drafted regulations,
permitting their swift resolution without the need for court involvement.
For most consumer filings, regulations could provide for streamlined proceed-
ings that would maximize speed and efficiency of process. Cases involving
more complex issues that required the exercise of federal "judicial power"
would be heard by federal district court judges, as part of their normal and
varied docket. Such a solution would resolve uncertainty regarding the inap-
propriate exercise of "judicial power" by non-Article III courts, incorporating
instead the constitutionally established standards for administrative law.'9 In
addition, this structure would promote efficiency in the resolution of bank-
ruptcy disputes by shortening the appeals process. Moving the first tier of
decision-making in most routine issues out of the courts and into administra-
tive offices could also reduce procedural costs. 20
This article makes the case for this solution as follows: Part II explains
the constitutional problem presented by non-Article III bankruptcy judges'
exercise of broad jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases. It first provides a
description of the Supreme Court's ruling in Stern and its impact on the
bankruptcy jurisdictional scheme. Next, it gives a historical explanation of
how and why bankruptcy courts were granted the statutory authority they
Trade, established by the Customs Court Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1581 et seq, which has exclusive
jurisdiction over civil actions commenced in connection with tariff and trade acts. For the purposes of this
paper, all references to federal district courts or judges refer to non-specialized courts or judges.
i9In other words, binding precedent would move away from Marathon towards Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission
v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986). This claim presupposes that Stern's effect on bankruptcy proceedings
is not merely a foreshadowing of cases that would also restrict the ability of executive and administrative
agencies to act within their currently delineated boundaries. If and how the Supreme Court is likely to re-
interpret the constitutional boundaries surrounding an agency's authority in light of its position in Stern is
an interesting consideration outside the scope of this article. For an insightful critique of the position the
Supreme Court appears to take on administrative agencies in Stern, see Troy A. McKenzie, Cetting to the
Core of Stern v. Marshall: History, Expertise, and the Separation of Powers, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 23, 45
(2012).
20See John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administrative Alterna-
tives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 109, 158 and n. 191 (2000). The extent of cost reduction is uncertain
because, as noted by Duffy, administrative and judicial procedures may nearly overlap in some contexts,
particularly if the administrative processes are extremely formal, or the court is particularly specialized. Id.
A thorough cost analysis would need to be conducted to determine whether cost savings would actually
accrue.
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currently enjoy. Finally, it suggests alternative reactions to Stern, concluding
that however unpalatable the need for dramatic change, a structural response
is warranted.
Part III presents the existing scholarship on proposed solutions to this
problem. Reflecting the long lifetime of constitutional concerns surrounding
bankruptcy jurisdiction, many of these articles date back several decades,2 '
but are nevertheless relevant to the current bankruptcy structure. More re-
cently, several authors have written in direct response to Stern.2 2
Part IV explains the basic principles of restructuring an organization, and
applies them to the bankruptcy system. It then identifies the ideological be-
liefs of two groups of bankruptcy scholars, the traditionalists and procedural-
ists, and suggests how each group might approach restructuring from a
strategic vantage point.
Part V explains why an alternative strategic goal for the bankruptcy sys-
tem is desirable, and how establishing a two-part jurisdictional scheme in-
volving an administrative agency and federal district judges is a superior
solution to what has been proposed by the traditionalists and intimated by
proceduralist scholarship. It further demonstrates that this solution, in addi-
tion to its other advantages, works as a compromise between the two most
prominent and conflicting ideological approaches to bankruptcy. Part VI
concludes.
II. THE IMPACT OF STERN ON THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
Under the current structure of the bankruptcy system, a bankruptcy
judge is the appointed arbiter of all bankruptcy cases, and it is primarily his or
her responsibility to interpret the Bankruptcy Code. He or she may hear all
bankruptcy cases and proceedings "arising under" the Bankruptcy Code, "aris-
ing in" the Bankruptcy Code, or "related to" a case by virtue of the district
court's referral of these cases and proceedings, as laid out in 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(a). However, the bankruptcy judge may only enter final judgment on
core proceedings arising under . . . or arising in" the bankruptcy case.2 3
These core proceedings are listed, albeit nonexclusively, in 28 U.S.C.
IISee, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Article III and Judicial Independence: Why the New Bankruptcy
Courts Are Unconstitutional, 70 GEo. LJ. 297, 298 (1981).
"
2 See Block-Lieb, supra note 2, at 118; Richard Levin, The Transition to Article III Bankruptcy Courts,
American Bankruptcy Institute Joint Session 335 (Sept. 19-20, 2012); Christopher S. Lockman,
Makalidung's Post: How Stern v. Marshall Is Shaking Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction to Its Core, 50 DuQ.
L. REV. 125, 166 (2012).
2 3As noted below, there is some disagreement as to whether this restriction on entering a final judg-
ment can be classified as a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, even when the judge has the statutory
authority to hear the matter and to enter proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The tentative
consensus appears to be that some form of jurisdiction exists over "non-core" proceedings, but the distinc-
tion between lack of jurisdiction to enter a final order and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is unclear.
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§ 157(b)(2). 2 4  The bankruptcy judge may also hear non-core proceedings
that are related to the bankruptcy case, but may only submit proposed find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law to the referring district court, which must
enter the final order or judgment. 25 The referring district court has the au-
thority to withdraw the reference for any case or proceeding for cause, and
must withdraw the reference on timely motion of a party if the proceeding
requires analysis of other federal laws affecting interstate commerce. 2 6
A. THE Stern Decision
In 2011 the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Stern, holding that 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), which gave bankruptcy judges power to issue final
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism Without A Foundation: Stern v Marshall, 2011 SuP. CT. REV. 183,
210-11 (2011).
"The text of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (2012) is reproduced below:
(2) Core proceedings include, but are not limited to-
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions from
property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interests for the purposes of
confirming a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of title 11 but not the liquidation or
estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death
claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
(1) determinations as to the dischargeablilty of particular debts;
(J) objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmation of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash
collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from
claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims against the
estate;
>(O) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or
the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relationship,
except personal injury tort or wrongful death claims; and
(P) recognition of foreign proceedings and other matters under chapter 15 of
title 11.
2528 U.S.C. §157(b) and (c).
2628 U.S.C. § 157(d). Such withdrawal is extremely rare. To demonstrate, in 2010 and 2011 the
total number of bankruptcy cases filed in the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts was 1,569,355 and 1,467,221,
respectively. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTs, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDI,
CiAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 280 tbl.F (2012), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
Statistics/JudicialBusiness/201 1/JudicialBusiness201 1.pdf (hereinafter cited as "2011 ANNUAL REPORT").
The total number of bankruptcy cases commenced in the U.S. District Courts for these years was 519 and
602, respectively. Id. at 47 tbl. C-2.
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rulings on "counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against
the estate," extended an unconstitutional grant of authority to bankruptcy
judges. Based on the reasoning used by the Court, many are concerned this
ruling will have far-reaching consequences for the remainder of §157,27 and
even beyond bankruptcy, for magistrates and other Article I courts. 28
Stern involved a dispute between the estate of Vickie Lynn Marshall,
better known as Playboy Playmate Anna Nicole Smith ("Smith"), and her
stepson, Pierce Marshall ("Pierce"), regarding the estate of her late husband,
J. Howard Marshall ("J. Howard"). The dispute began in Texas probate
court. Smith took the position that her aged husband, a Texas billionaire
who had married the 26-year-old Smith when he was 89, had promised to
provide for her after his death. Although he lavished gifts on her during their
13-month marriage, she was given nothing under the will.29 Smith disputed
the will, and argued that Pierce, J. Howard's son by another marriage, was to
blame for her exclusion. She claimed that Pierce had exercised undue influ-
ence on his aged father to prevent him from fulfilling his promise to provide
for Smith, by surrounding him with hired guards and effectively imprisoning
him against his wishes.3o
While the probate case was pending, Smith filed for bankruptcy in the
Central District of California. Pierce filed a proof of claim against her, claim-
ing defamation based on statements that Smith's attorneys had made to the
press in connection with the dispute over J. Howard's estate. In objecting to
Pierce's proof of claim, Smith argued truth as a defense, and filed a counter-
claim, also in bankruptcy court, for tortious interference with an inter vivos
gift.3' The bankruptcy court heard and issued rulings on both the objection
to the proof of claim and the counterclaim. Subsequently, the Texas probate
court upheld J. Howard's estate plan as valid. 32 Pierce appealed the court's
ruling on Smith's counterclaim, and the case ultimately went to the Supreme
Court. 3
During the course of the proceedings, both Pierce and Smith passed away,
"Evidence suggests these concerns are warranted. See Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re
Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 702 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2012) and discussion infra 130.
28See Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 207-12.
2
9Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 300 (2006).
'old. at 301.
"Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601.
32Marshall, 547 U.S. at 294.
"The procedural history is much more complicated than what is presented here. In fact, the case was
reviewed by the Supreme Court not once, but twice-a phenomenal result when one considers the rarity
of bankruptcy appeals. As one study found, the Supreme Court hears an average of three or four bank-
ruptcy cases per year. Robert M. Lawless & Dylan Lager Murray, An Empirical Analysis of Bankruptcy
Certiorari, 62 Mo. L. REV. 101, 132 (1997). Given the number of bankruptcy filings per year, this makes
the chances of any given bankruptcy case making it to the Supreme Court significantly lower than the
chances of an individual being struck by lightning in his or her lifetime.
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and the case continued to be litigated by their respective estates. Howard
Stern, as Smith's executor, became the lead party name.34
In Stern, the Supreme Court ruled that under the language of § 157, both
the objection to Pierce's proof of claim and Smith's counterclaim constituted
"core proceedings," either arising under or arising in Smith's bankruptcy case,
and accordingly the bankruptcy court was authorized under the statute to
enter a final judgment in the proceeding.35 In so ruling, the Court rejected
the statutory argument adopted by the Ninth Circuit and pressed by Pierce,
that a compulsory counterclaim such as Smith's might constitute a "core pro-
ceeding" only if the proceeding also arises in the bankruptcy case or arises
under the Bankruptcy Code, and in this case it did not.36 The Court also
rejected Pierce's argument that the bankruptcy court could not hear a matter
of personal injury tort pursuant to § 157(b)(5),3 noting that the allocation of
authority to enter final judgment between the bankruptcy court and the dis-
trict court "does not implicate questions of subject matter jurisdiction." 8
However, the Court concluded that the statutory grant of authority was
nonetheless constitutionally impermissible under a separation of powers argu-
ment. The Court noted that Article III of the United States Constitution
mandates that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States" be vested in courts
in which the judges have life tenure and salary protection.39 While recogniz-
ing that the three branches of government "are not hermetically sealed from
one another," the Court nevertheless objected to a bankruptcy judge's final
ruling on Smith's state law claim as offensive to the system of checks and
balances established in Article III.40 Even acknowledging exceptions to the
requirement of Article III judicial determinations, such as cases falling under
the "public rights" doctrine, the Court determined that this action did not fall
under such an exception. The Court noted that, unlike earlier cases in which
bankruptcy court jurisdiction had been upheld,41 ruling on Smith's counter-
claim was not necessary for a determination of Pierce's proof of claim, and
therefore not "'integral to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relation-
ship.'"42 The Court also rejected arguments that Pierce's proof of claim in
"Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2594.
"Id. at 2604.
16Id. at 2604; see Marshall v. Stern (In re Marshall), 600 F.3d 1037, 1059 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted
in part, 131 S. Ct. 63, 177 L. Ed. 2d 1152 (2010).
"Section 157(b)(5) states: "The district court shall order that personal injury tort and wrongful death
claims shall be tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending, or in the district court in
the district in which the claim arose, as determined by the district court in which the bankruptcy case is
pending." 11 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (2012).
"Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2607.
"Id. at 2608.
4old. at 2609.
"See, e.g., Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 334 (1966).
"Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2617 (quoting Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42, 44 (1990)).
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Smith's bankruptcy case signified consent to the bankruptcy court's jurisdic-
tion over the counterclaim4 3 and that bankruptcy courts could proceed to
final ruling as "adjuncts" of the district court.4 4
The Court concluded Congress had overstepped its bounds in giving the
bankruptcy court statutory authority to enter final judgment on a state law
counterclaim that required findings of fact and conclusions of law indepen-
dent from a ruling on the underlying proof of claim.45 Under that reasoning,
it further concluded that because the bankruptcy court had lacked constitu-
tional authority to enter final judgment on Smith's counterclaim, the ruling of
the Texas probate court had been issued first, and precluded later considera-
tion in the bankruptcy proceedings.
B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The ruling, for many, was a "constitutional bombshell on the bankruptcy
system,"46 but not altogether unforeseeable. Prior to 1978, jurisdiction in
bankruptcy cases was split between "summary jurisdiction," under which the
matter could be heard by a referee, the precursor to a bankruptcy judge, and
"plenary jurisdiction." Summary jurisdiction was essentially in ren,47 dealing
only with property in the uncontested custody of the debtor at the time the
bankruptcy was filed.48 Summary proceedings generally included the allow-
ance or disallowance of claims, determination of exemptions, consideration of
the discharge, and turnover motions, among other things.49 Disputes outside
of summary jurisdiction, termed plenary proceedings, had to be brought
outside the bankruptcy court, unless the parties otherwise consented to
bankruptcy court jurisdiction.5o
Unfortunately, the scope of summary jurisdiction was imprecise:51 for ex-
4Id. at 2614.
44d. at 2618.
45Id. at 2620. For an in-depth discussion of Stern's factual background and holding, see Ralph Bruba-
ker, Article III's Bleak House (Part I): The Statutory Limits of Bankruptcy Judges' Core Jurisdiction, 31
BANKR. L. LETTER No. 8, at 1 (Aug. 2011); Ralph Brubaker, Article III's Bleak House (Part II): The
Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy Judges' Core jurisdiction, 31 BANKR. L. LETTER No. 9, at 1 (Sept.
2011).
46Stephen tather, Thoughts About the Impact of Stern v. Marshall, BANKR. L. BLOG LEXISNEXIS COM-
TYS. (June 29, 2011), http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/bankruptcylaw/blogs/bankruptcylawblog/
archive/2011/06/29/thoughts-aboutthe-impact-of-stern-v-marshall.aspx
47See Ralph Brubaker, A "Summary" Statutory and Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy Judges' Core
Jurisdiction After Stern v. Marshall, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121, 128 (2012).
"Property in the control of one holding it under an adverse claim that was "merely colorable" also fell
within the referee's summary jurisdiction. This standard invited litigation. See Vern Countryman, Emer-
gency Rule Compounds Emergency, 57 AM. BANKR. LJ. 1, 3 (1983).
"Bankruptcy Act § 2a (originally codified at 11 U.S.C. § 11a (1964)).
"oSee Martin Gendel,jurisdiction Problems in Baniruptcy Court, 44 J. NATL CONF. REF. BANKR. 61,
61 (1970).
"McKenzie, supra note 19, at 40.
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ample, in Katchen v. Landy the Supreme Court ruled that summary jurisdic-
tion encompassed proceedings necessary to rule on a proof of claim, even if
such proceedings were usually categorized as plenary, as were recovery of
fraudulent conveyances or preferences.s 2 This uncertainty created fertile
ground for litigation over jurisdiction. As a consequence, bankruptcy schol-
ars chafed against the summary/plenary distinction, which they saw as ineffi-
cient.5 The primary complaint was that the system encouraged delay,5 but
costs were also an issue," as was the perceived opportunity to forum shop.56
The Bankruptcy Code was largely intended to fix the problems presented
by the summary/plenary distinction. The Commission on the Bankruptcy
Law of the United States, appointed in 1973, recommended establishing an
administrative branch to manage the referee's administrative duties,n and a
bankruptcy court to handle all litigable controversies.58 The Commission
also recommended "[a] comprehensive grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy
courts over all controversies arising out of any bankruptcy or rehabilitation
case," which would "foster the development of a more uniform, cohesive body
of substantive and procedural law."59 Interestingly, the Commission did not
recommend that these bankruptcy judges be appointed under Article III, al-
though constitutional concerns arose quickly in congressional discussion of
the proposed jurisdictional expansion.60  Ultimately, Congress opted for a
system of bankruptcy judges who would not enjoy life tenure, and therefore
be outside of Article III. Such a decision was not without controversy, and
5
2 Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 330-31 (1966).
53Gendel, supra note 50, at 62.
'
4 See Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief Justice, the Judicial
Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 1, 6 (1985); Gendel, supra note 50, at 62;
Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 Am. BANKR. INST. L.
REv. 5, 25 (1995).
"Gendel, supra note 50.
"See id. at 62-63.
'
7 The separation of judicial and administrative functions was viewed as necessary to combat a common
criticism that had arisen regarding the "bankruptcy ring," which referred to a small group of bankruptcy
professionals who traded appointments in various cases, controlling from inside the practice of bankruptcy
law in a given geographic area. See Linda Coco, Stigma, Prestige and the Cultural Context of Debt: A
Critical Analysis of the Bankruptcy Judge's Non-Article III Status, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 181, 213-14
(2011).
"In making this assertion, the Commission rejected the conclusion of the Brookings Institution that an
administrative hearing and appeals procedure would suffice. COMM'N ON BANKR. LAWS, REPORT ON THE
BANKRUPTcy LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. I, at 87 (1973).
91d. at 90.
'In language that now smacks of irony, the Commission confidently noted that '[t]he constitutional-
ity of a grant of a jurisdiction in such comprehensive terms should not be subject to any serious doubt." Id.
at 91. The Commission appears to have overlooked any problems with regards to the constitutional status
of non-Article III bankruptcy judges. In defending its statement, the Commission notes that the jurisdic-
tional grants to courts of bankruptcy in the 1841 and 1867 Acts, courts that were seated with federal
district judges, were nearly as extensive. Id.
203
AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL
the majority of academics consulted doubted the system's constitutionality. 61
The test for the Bankruptcy Code's grant of authority to bankruptcy
judges came soon after its enactment, in Marathon, a case involving the bank-
ruptcy court's exercise of jurisdiction over a debtor's state law counterclaim
against a creditor.62 In a splintered decision, thereafter strongly criticized by
the academic community, 63 the Supreme Court struck down the system es-
tablished by the Bankruptcy Code on the grounds that "the Bankruptcy Act
of 1978 [ ] has impermissibly removed most, if not all, of 'the essential attrib-
utes of the judicial power' from the Art. III district court, and has vested
those attributes in a non-Art. III adjunct." 64 The Court stayed its judgment
for a few months to permit Congress the opportunity to reconstitute the
bankruptcy courts.65
Congress failed to act within the allotted time, although it held multiple
hearings in an attempt to find an alternative to creating Article III bank-
ruptcy courts, without much success. 66 Anticipating congressional inaction,
the Judicial Conference of the United States drafted and promulgated to all
district courts an "Emergency Rule,"67 which bifurcated the bankruptcy
court's jurisdictional authority between "core" bankruptcy matters, perceived
not to be subject to the Marathon ruling and accordingly within the power
of bankruptcy judges to issue final rulings, and "non-core" matters, which
would be heard in the district court.68 Criticized by many as unworkable
and unconstitutional, 69 the courts nevertheless upheld the Emergency Rule as
6 1Block-Lieb, supra note 2, at 69-70; see Krattenmaker, supra note 21. Krattenmaker was one of the
experts consulted by Congress.
62N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
65See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101
HARv. L. REV. 915, 917-19 (1988); Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bank-
ruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. L. REV. 747, 770 (2010); Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III
Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 581, 598-99 (1985).
6 Marathon, 458 U.S. at 87.
"Id. at 88 (staying judgment until October 4, 1982); United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 459
U.S. 813 (1982) (extending stay on motion of the Solicitor General to December 24, 1982); United States
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 459 U.S. 1094 (1982) (denying the Solicitor General's application to further
extend the stay on December 23, 1982).
"*See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 6109 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1982) (hereinafter cited as "Hearing on H.R. 6109"); see also Block-
Lieb, supra note 2, at 94.
"
7Reproduced in Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. Decision: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 435 (1983).
61CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 50 (2009).
69Countryman, Emergency, supra note 48, at 3; Prepared Statement of Jonathan C. Rose, Northern
Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. Decision: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 19-20 (1983). Countryman, on behalf of the National Bankruptcy Confer-
ence, criticized the Emergency Rule as invalid because district judges had no authority to promulgate the
Rule, nor did they have jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings. Bankruptcy jurisdiction was instead
vested entirely (and unconstitutionally) in bankruptcy courts to the exclusion of district courts. The
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constitutional. 70 Eventually, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Bill (BAFJA),7' which essentially codified the Emer-
gency Rule's approach.
Most academics writing on the topic during the last thirty five years
have argued that the compromise of bankruptcy jurisdiction reached by Con-
gress in 1978 is inherently flawed, or at least constitutionally suspect.72 Con-
gress' compromise on Article III status in 1978, and again in 1984,
successfully enabled it to move beyond questions of jurisdiction in order to
pass substantive reforms regarding the treatment of debtors in bankruptcy,
but at the expense of future uncertainty regarding a bankruptcy judge's con-
stitutional ability to make final determinations. The trouble has arisen prima-
rily in the context of a debtor's counterclaims against a creditor, but there are
many other instances in which a bankruptcy court's entry of final judgment
could be questioned under Stern's reasoning.73
Despite the warnings, both during the legislative process and after Mara-
thon, Congress has still failed to apply a meaningful fix to the system. The
BAJCA "band-aid" of 1984 did not resolve the underlying Marathon issue,
although the Supreme Court did manage to avoid confronting the issue again
for nearly thirty years.74 This extended respite is more likely due to the
inherit limitations on bankruptcy appeals7 5 than a period of constitutional
conformity, as demonstrated not only by Stern, but also by the existence of
many bankruptcy practices that appear, on their face, to violate the Stern
reasoning.76 Without additional guidance from the Supreme Court regarding
other "core proceedings" not covered in the Stern holding, but nonetheless
listed in the same statute and arguably controlled by Article III "judicial
National Bankruptcy Conference also criticized the Emergency Rule as unworkable in that it would invite
further litigation.
70The fact that the Emergency Rule worked was surprising to many. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 494 (1997) ("Like a character in a Road Runner
cartoon, the bankruptcy courts had run off the cliff - but had not fallen.").
7iPub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
72See e.g., Countryman, supra note 54, at 1; Lawrence P. King, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the
Bankrutpcy Amendments of 1984, 38 VAND. L. REV. 675, 676 (1985).
73For example, efforts by the estate to recover funds from a claimant or a third party, including avoid-
ance powers by the trustee and fraudulent conveyance actions, are core proceedings that some have argued
are outside a bankruptcy judge's constitutional ability to enter a final judgment. See Exec. Benefits Ins.
Agency, Inc. v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 702 F.3d at 556 (9th Cir. 2012); see also
Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 207. ("[Alfter Stern v Marshall was decided, I received a phone call from a
bankruptcy judge who said that he issued between 80,000 and 90,000 orders a year, and he estimated that
about 25 percent of them involve a state law claim that might be implicated by the decisions.").
74See LoPucki, supra note 70, at 494 (noting that district courts and courts of appeals had unanimously
upheld the Emergency Rule as constitutional).
7
sSee McKenzie, supra note 63, at 793.
7
"Douglas G. Baird, Blue Collar Constitutional Law, 86 AM. BANKR. LJ. 3, 8 (2012).
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power," bankruptcy courts will probably, and rightly in the minds of many,77
continue to act much as they always have.78 As commentators have recog-
nized, given the scope of these practices and the sheer number of bankruptcy
filings in the United States, bankruptcy courts may be issuing hundreds of
final orders every week that violate the constitutional parameters outlined in
Stern.79
C. POSSIBLE RESPONSES
There can be two responses to the concerns raised by Stern. On the one
hand, some commentators have been inclined to minimize concerns about
Stern, suggesting that "initial reactions were overblown."80 These individu-
als see the Stern decision as limited in scope; a complication that may be
resolved by amending the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure or the
Standing Order of Referral from district courts to bankruptcy courts. On the
other hand, many commentators believe that a structural solution is required,
given the breadth of the Stem decision and its potential impact not just in
bankruptcy but in all Article I courts.
1. The Impact of Stern Should Not Be Overstated
In the Court's Stern opinion, Justice Roberts, in an apparent effort to
downplay the constitutional nature of the decision, expresses the belief that
the question decided is a "narrow" one,8 ' implying that the decision must also
be narrow. If obtaining constitutional conformity is only a matter of prevent-
ing bankruptcy courts from entering final judgment on counterclaims, then
the problem should arise infrequently and be easily resolved. The Supreme
Court indicated that bankruptcy courts would not be barred from hearing
counterclaims or from proposing findings of fact and conclusions of law so
long as it is the district court that ultimately enters the final decision.82
When viewed in this light, Stern requires no great shakeup of the system, and
applies to only a limited number of cases. We need only read counterclaims
out of § 157(b)(2)'s list of core proceedings, and into § 157(c)(1)'s list of "re-
lated" proceedings.8 3 Under § 157(c)(2), the bankruptcy court may still hear
77See, e.g., id. at 20.
78See Roberta A. Colton and Stephanie C. Lieb, Is Bankruptcy Jurisdiction in Flux Because of Anna
Nicole Smith?, 86 FLA. Bus. J. 36, 40 (Jan. 2012) (citing Tampa Bankruptcy Judge Michael G. Williamson's
view that bankruptcy courts should function "without too much of a hitch" even in light of Stern).
79See Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 207; Baird, supra note 76, at 17.
soKaren Cordry, Stern v. Marshall: Much Ado About Something, NORTON BANICR. L. ADVISER 1, 1
(Dec. 2011).
"Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. at 2594, 2620, 180 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2011).
821d.
'Justice Roberts' opinion seems to direct this course of action, noting that "[w]e do not think the
removal of counterclaims such as Vickie's from core bankruptcy jurisdiction meaningfully changes the
division of labor in the current statute[.]" Id.
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the case, subject to review by the district court judge under § 158, and the
parties may consent to a final determination by the bankruptcy judge.
Even supposing that the ramifications of Stern are inescapable outside the
limited context of §157(b)(2)(C), we might nevertheless reason, as Andrew
Jackson is purported to have done in response to a Supreme Court decision
regarding the government of Indian territory,84 that Justice Roberts has made
his decision - now let him enforce it.85 Given the costs of appeal, the weight
given to the bankruptcy court's findings on appeal86 and the multiple layers
of appeal required before a ruling is considered precedential by all involved,87
another case detailing the alleged constitutional overreach of the bankruptcy
courts might not reach the Supreme Court for another thirty years.
Acknowledging that lower courts share the duty to uphold constitutional
limits on Article I courts, and may rule in a way that challenges existing
bankruptcy court practices,88 there is an argument to be made that the con-
stitutional violation observed in Stern is simply not worth addressing on a
structural level in light of the costs of restructuring. As noted above, the
exercise of authority challenged by a broad reading of Stern has been exhib-
ited for the past thirty years. Bankruptcy judges and litigants have estab-
lished patterns and practices based on the assumption that a bankruptcy
judge's ability to hear and make a final ruling on "core proceedings" increases
the efficient resolution of a bankruptcy case. A rework of the system would
not only threaten these known patterns, it would also require the develop-
ment of new practices that are likely to be less efficient than what is cur-
rently in place, creating a "constitutionally required game of jurisdictional
ping-pong between courts" that will lead to "inefficiency, increased cost, de-
lay, and needless additional suffering among those faced with bankruptcy."8 9
Taking these costs into account, we might conclude that even if Justice Rob-
erts was correct, the ramifications of his ruling are simply impracticable. 0
Rather than grapple with what appear to be constitutional deficiencies in the
84Worchester v. State of Ga., 31 U.S. 515 (1832) (state criminal statutes are preempted to the extent
they deal with Indian territory).
a
5See Coleman v. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 715 F.2d 1156, 1158 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing II
CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HIsTORY 219 (1922)).
56See FED. R. BANKR. P. 8013 (according the findings of a bankruptcy judge the same weight given the
findings of a district judge under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52, a trial
court's findings of fact "must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." FED. R. Civ. P. 52.
VSee Daniel J. Bussel, Power, Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, 41 UCLA
L. REv. 1063 (1994).
"See discussion infra note 119 and accompanying text.
"
9Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2630, 180 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2011) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See id. at
2599 (majority opinion) (noting 'the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful
in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitu-
tion."' (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)).
'Perhaps in anticipation of such a response, the majority defends its ruling as follows:
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structure of the bankruptcy system, the bankruptcy community should work
around Stern as best they can. Most bankruptcy courts appear to have done
just that.
Of particular note in this regard, the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy
Rules has proposed rulemaking responses to Stern that would require more
precise pleading as to whether a proceeding is core or non-core, and an ex-
plicit statement of consent as to all non-core proceedings.91 In the alterna-
tive, the Committee has also suggested changing the default rule to require
that a party make a timely demand that final rulings be entered by a district
judge, or waive their right to final judgments in an Article III fo-
rum.92 Finally, several federal district courts, including the Southern District
of New York and the District of Delaware, have provided that the district
court may treat any of the bankruptcy judge's orders as proposed findings of
fact and conclusion of law, in the event that the district court finds the bank-
ruptcy judge lacked authority to enter the final judgment. 3 It is hoped that
these suggestions will permit a uniform response to Stern that may pre-empt
much of the anticipated litigation in this area.
2. Stern's Far-Reaching Implications
On the other hand, it may be error to downplay the importance of the
Stern ruling, or suppose that anything less than structural reform is adequate.
Chief Justice Roberts' statement that the ruling is a narrow one may suggest
nothing more than his own pragmatic approach: while one might infer that
Roberts will respond practically to whatever further challenges arise, relying
on such a response from other members of the Stern majority, notably Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas, would be unwise. At minimum, this introduces un-
certainty as to the court's response in future cases to the proposed procedural
solutions described above.
It is worth noting, for example, that there is nothing in the language of
If our decision today does not change all that much, then why the fuss? Is there
really a threat to the separation of powers where Congress has conferred the judi-
cial power outside Article III only over certain counterclaims in bankruptcy? The
short but emphatic answer is yes. A statute may no more lawfully chip away at the
authority of the Judicial Branch than it may eliminate it entirely. . . . We cannot
compromise the integrity of the system of separated powers and the role of the
Judiciary in that system, even with respect to challenges that may seem innocuous
at first blush.
Id. at 2620; see id. 2629 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding that any intrusion on the Judicial Branch in
this case must be termed de minimis).
91Memorandum to Advisory Comm. on Bankr. Rules from Subcomm. on Bus. Issues Regarding
Rulemaking Responses to Stern v. Marshall (Mar. 14, 2012), in 18TH ANNUAL ROCKY MOUN-
TAIN BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE 359, 359-360 (2013).
92 d. at 360.
93Id. at 370.
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§ 157 that explicitly permits bankruptcy courts to deal with unconstitution-
ally categorized "core" proceedings as if they were "non-core" proceedings.
Rather, § 157(b)(1) permits bankruptcy judges to "hear and determine ... all
core proceedings" as defined in subsection (2), and § 157(c)(1) permits bank-
ruptcy judges to "hear a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is
otherwise related to a case under title 11 . . . ." The Stern majority explicitly
found that counterclaims such as Smith's were core proceedings as provided
in the statute.94 As a technical matter, the statute does not provide for core
proceedings that lack constitutional validity.
It may be that the Court's suggestion that its decision merely strikes the
counterclaims of § 157(b)(2)(C), placing them in the "catchall" category of
§157(c)(1), sufficiently overcoming statutory deficiencies. It has also been
credibly suggested that district court judges have sufficient power under 28
U.S.C. § 151 to grant bankruptcy judges the authority to treat these uncon-
stitutionally core proceedings as non-core proceedings, rendering concerns on
this score unnecessary.95 However, it may also be that under the current
statutory structure the bankruptcy court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
over the proceedings, nullifying any action taken in that regard.96 It is well-
known that a party cannot consent to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.97
One response to the challenge of subject matter jurisdiction may be to
attempt an analogy between bankruptcy court judges and magistrate judges.
Supreme Court precedent appears to have established that constitutional
concerns in the context of magistrate judge rulings may be alleviated or even
resolved on the basis of litigant consent and the close supervision of Article
III district courts, which the Court has held retain the ultimate authority to
make decisions.98 These rulings suggest that concerns of subject matter juris-
94Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2604 (majority opinion).
"Statement of Judge Eugene R. Wedoff, Bankr. Judge for the N. Dist. of Ill. and a member of the
Advisory Comm. on Bankr. Rules, Rock Drills and Chipping Hammers: Cutting Through the Jurisdic-
tional Challenges of Stern v. Marshall (January 25, 2013).
9 6The debate regarding whether a party's consent is sufficient to waive the constitutional concerns
raised in Stern hinges on whether the Supreme Court's ruling implicated subject-matter jurisdiction, de-
spite its protestations to the contrary, or not. For conflicting opinions, compare Brubaker, Article IIIs
Bleak House (Part II), supra note 45 (determining based on the Court's reliance on historical precedent and
dismissive reference to subject-matter jurisdiction that consent does constitute a valid waiver of Stern
concerns), with Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 211 (arguing there is no apparent basis for distinguishing
between lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and inability to enter a final judgment).
97See Union Pac. R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Cent.
Region, 558 U.S. 67, 80-81 (2009).
9
"See A Constitutional Analysis of Magistrate Judge Authority, 150 F.R.D. 247, 2 72 (1993); U.S. v.
Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 680-81 (1980) ("Congress made clear that the district court has plenary discretion
whether to authorize a magistrate to hold an evidentiary hearing and that the magistrate acts subsidiary to
and only in aid of the district court."); Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991) ("There is no
constitutional infirmity in the delegation of felony trial jury selection to a magistrate when the litigants
consent.").
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diction do not arise in such a context. However, the analogy between the
Supreme Court's rulings regarding magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges is
undercut by the ruling of Stern; the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the
argument that bankruptcy courts acted as adjuncts of the district courts, stat-
ing definitively that "a court exercising such broad powers is no mere adjunct
of anyone."99 In Stern, at least, the Supreme Court does not appear to grant
the bankruptcy court authority to issue rulings by virtue of its relationship
with the district court, even if a magistrate judge does enjoy such
authority.100
The concerns raised thus far are also not limited to counterclaims brought
by the estate against a creditor. There are logical ramifications to the Stern
ruling in other proceedings. Most prominently, the argument has been made
that a bankruptcy court's final ruling in a fraudulent conveyance action,
which has been determined to be a "private," rather than a "public" action, 01
is similarly unconstitutional.102 The expanded application of Stern to other
core proceedings suggests that it will affect ever-larger numbers of cases, and
result in ever-larger delays and inefficiencies, an unmitigated disaster in a sys-
tem that relies on speed and efficiency to effectively operate. 03
The Ninth Circuit recently concluded that Stern does in fact go beyond
its "narrow ruling," affecting the bankruptcy court's ability to enter final
judgments in fraudulent conveyance actions. The case, Bellingham Insur-
ance,104 involved the transfer of assets from one insurance company ("BIA"),
financially insolvent and burdened by debt, to a new insurance company
("EBIA"), both companies owned and operated by the same married couple.
After BIA filed for bankruptcy, the chapter 7 trustee brought an action
against EBIA to recover the transferred assets. Although EBIA initially re-
quested a jury trial, per the terms of Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,105
which ruled that the constitutional right to a jury trial was preserved in
fraudulent conveyance actions against parties who had not filed claims
"Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2611.
"Chemerinsky has questioned the apparent lack of consistency between the constitutionality of mag-
istrate judges activities and the ruling in Stern. He concludes, based on the similarities between the
judicial responsibilities of magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges, that Stern may have far-reaching impli-
cations for magistrate judges as well. Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 211-12. One need not go this far,
however, to conclude that whatever constitutional latitude enjoyed under the Magistrate Judge Act is
unlikely to be extended to the Bankruptcy Code.
ioiGranfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 55 (1989).
1O2Brubaker, Article III's Bleak House (Part II), supra note 45.
'See Memorandum to Advisory Comm. supra note 91, at 371 (evaluating the need for responsive
rulemaking and determining that the decision in In re Ortiz, 665 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 2011), established
sufficient cause to justify a rulemaking response).
1o
4 Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 702 F.3d 553 (9th
Cir. 2012).
1osGranfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 36.
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against the estate, it then requested the district court to stay withdrawal of
the reference to permit the bankruptcy court to issue summary judgment.
After summary judgment was unfavorable, EBIA abandoned its motion to
withdraw the reference and appealed the bankruptcy court's final order.
Before the case reached the Ninth Circuit, Stern was decided, at which point
EBIA raised jurisdiction as an appealable issue.
The Ninth Circuit interpreted the interaction between Stern and
Granfinanciera to compel the conclusion that fraudulent conveyance actions
against parties who have not filed claims in the underlying bankruptcy cannot
"be consigned to the bankruptcy courts without doing violence to the consti-
tutional separation of powers."10 6 Grappling with the distinction between
"public" and "private" rights addressed in both Stern and Granfinanciera, the
Ninth Circuit effectively abandoned the "core" and "non-core" distinction
adopted by Congress after Marathon. Instead, the panel concluded that the
determining factor for whether or not an Article III court was needed in
cases involving preferences,107 fraudulent conveyances,108 and the counter-
claims of the estate against a creditor,' 09 is whether the claim against a credi-
tor "necessarily had to be resolved in the course of the claims-allowance
process."" 0 Where it was not, a final order could only be entered by the
Article III court. In a footnote, the panel left open the possibility that addi-
tional "core" proceedings could fall in the future, noting that the Supreme
Court had never decided whether "even the 'restructuring of debtor-creditor
relations' was in fact a 'public right,'" permitting final review of a non-Article
III bankruptcy court."'
The Ninth Circuit panel nevertheless upheld the bankruptcy court's rul-
ing on the fraudulent transfer issue, however, by finding that EBIA had con-
sented to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction by explicitly requesting the
district court to leave the case in the bankruptcy court until summary judg-
ment, and then failing to raise the jurisdictional issue until appearing before
the Ninth Circuit.11 2 In so finding, the Ninth Circuit quotes Stern's some-
what ambiguous assertion that § 157 "does not implicate questions of subject
matter jurisdiction." However, the panel also notes the Supreme Court's lan-
guage in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor," 3 in which the
Court upheld the authority of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
o
6 1n re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc., 702 F.3d at 562.
'
0 7Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966) (addressing the issue of a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to
order surrender of voidable preferences).
'
0 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 55.
'"
9Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 180 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2011).
"oln re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc., 702 F.3d at 564.
"Id. at 561, n.6.
1121d. at 566.
"'Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
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("CFTC") to exercise jurisdiction over common-law counterclaims, asserting
that "notions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive" when Article III
issues of checks and balances are at issue.114 The Ninth Circuit's apparent
attempt to limit the impact of its ruling by allowing for litigant consent in
this area is problematic for the reasons given above, including the difficulty in
distinguishing between lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, which cannot be
waived by consent, and lack of power to issue a final judgment, which the
Ninth Circuit ruled can be so waived.'15 The Ninth Circuit's conclusion also
conflicts with that of the Sixth Circuit in Waldman v. Stone,116 which ruled
that the creditor Waldman's objection to the bankruptcy court's constitu-
tional authority to enter final judgment "implicates not only his personal
rights, but also the structural principle advanced by Article III. And that
principle is not Waldman's to waive." 117
Bellingham and Waldman are only two of a plenitude of cases struggling
to respond to constitutional challenges against a bankruptcy court's ability to
issue final orders in core proceedings.lss It is reasonable to expect that a
growing number of Circuits will be called upon to consider similar challenges.
Even if subject-matter jurisdiction is not implicated, as indicated by Chief
Justice Roberts in the statutory analysis portion of the Stern ruling,1"9 the
ruling of Stern may nevertheless compel more substantive action, especially in
light of the historical background and the inescapable conclusion that this
problem has gone on for far too long. Although it may be possible to preserve
the benefits of the current bankruptcy system for some period of time, given
the current Court's ruling on the constitutionality of that system and the
114 See id. at 851.
"'See Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 211.
116698 F.3d 910, 918 (6th Cit. 2012).
"
71d.
"sSee, e.g., Gecker v. Flynn, 467 B.R. 128, 132 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (although some of the state law coun-
terclaims could be resolved in the process of ruling on the creditors' proofs of claim, not all counterclaims
appeared to be amenable, justifying withdrawal of the reference); Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A., 480 B.R. 179, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (although unlikely that all factual and legal issues
presented would be resolved in the course of ruling on creditor's claims, withdrawal of the reference was
not warranted at the pretrial stage); Picard v. Estate of Madoff, 464 B.R. 578, 585-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(bankruptcy court retains authority to determine common law counterclaims by the trustee of the estate
against creditors to the extent it must do so to determine allowance or disallowance of creditors' claims).
"'Others have taken comfort in the Stern opinion's dismissal of subject-matter jurisdiction early in the
opinion, citing it as evidence that the Supreme Court is likely to permit bankruptcy courts to hear cases on
the basis of consent, even if Article III is implicated. See Brubaker, Article III's Bleak House (Part II), supra
note 45. However, considering that the reference to subject-matter jurisdiction was in response to an
unrelated statutory argument by Pierce, it is unclear how much weight it should bear in this context.
Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2606, 180 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2011). The argument that Pierce's consent
should overcome the constitutional issue was explicitly rejected, id. at 2614, and the distinction, if any
exists, between a bankruptcy court's inability to enter final judgment and lack of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion was left unexplained. The issue merits further exploration.
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historical view that suggests such a ruling is far from an anomaly, it is appar-
ent that some form of restructuring is warranted.12 0
III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ARTICLE III
BANKRUTPCY COURTS
A. FOR: A HISTORICAL ARGUMENT
Most who advocate for a substantive response to the constitutional chal-
lenge laid out in Stern have recommended the same clear choice: to simply
give bankruptcy judges life tenure. 12 1 Indeed, many proponents of this view
believe that the fact that this was not done in the first instance is an unfortu-
nate historical error, and Congress should take the opportunity to fix it. Do-
ing so will require Congress to address difficult issues regarding the
appointments process, but will ultimately resolve all constitutional concerns
surrounding bankruptcy courts.
When the Bankruptcy Code was in the drafting process, the general feel-
ing was that departure from the system of summary and plenary jurisdiction
was necessary as a matter of efficiency.12 2 Quick resolution of claims was
necessary to preserve value, particularly in operating businesses. In order to
promote speed and efficiency in this regard, it was necessary to create a one-
stop-shop for all proceedings arising in, arising under, or related to the bank-
ruptcy filing. In light of these considerations, the logical approach was the
promotion of bankruptcy jurists to a position of independence and authority
commensurate with the broadened responsibility.12 3 As recognized by wit-
nesses before the House of Representatives and by Representatives Peter
Rodino and M. Caldwell Butler, life tenure and salary protection, the require-
120t is worth acknowledging at this juncture that, having been a participant in the current bankruptcy
structure, I appreciate its significant positive attributes. Further, I have great respect and appreciation for
bankruptcy judges, who are the primary drivers of the current system's positive attributes, and are likely
to be the individuals most significantly affected by any proposed restructuring. However, based on the
above analysis, the current structure cannot stand as a constitutional matter. Supposing this to be the
case, the task at hand becomes one of establishing a system which can withstand constitutional muster,
while also fulfilling the most important goals of bankruptcy, and bearing in mind other important consider-
ations. The remainder of the article is dedicated to this task.
12iFeeney, supra note 15, at 401 ("Article III status for bankruptcy judges is the only truly effective
solution to the problems created by Marathon, the allocation of authority under BAFJA, and Stern."
(emphasis added)).
122See COMM'N ON BANKR. LAws, supra note 58, at 2-4, 90 (recommending "a comprehensive grant of
jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts over all controversies arising out of any bankruptcy or rehabilitation
case," which would "foster the development of a more uniform, cohesive body of substantive and procedu-
ral law").
123Block-Lieb, supra note 2, at 69-70; see Lawrence P. King, The Unmaking of a Bankruptcy Court:
Aftennath of Northern Pipeline v. Marathon, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 99, 100 (1983); Krattenmaker,
supra note 21; Resnik, supra note 63, at 615 (noting that bankruptcy courts are where major social policy
issues such as asbestos, toxic waste cleanups, and labor relations play out, and suggesting that Article III
status is an important ingredient in just adjudication).
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ments introduced by Article III, were necessary elements.124
Given these premises, it is remarkable that life tenure was sacrificed in
the course of legislative compromise, 125 with no clear reason for its removal.
The only identifiable explanations are that Article III federal judges opposed
granting bankruptcy judges Article III status because of a perceived dilution
of prestige that would result,126 an argument whose validity is subject to
debate,12 7 and some members of the Senate opposed the creation of more
lifetime judicial appointments.12 8 The Judicial Conference also expressed op-
position to the creation of "specialized courts," but this argument was dis-
missed by many as "contrary to all the trends of modern judicial
administration";129 Specialized Article III courts exist for patents and interna-
tional trade, and there are non-Article III courts in the areas of bankruptcy,
tax, and military court martials. Proponents of a specialized Article III bank-
ruptcy court argue that specialized courts provide obvious advantages for
litigants in terms of speed and efficiency.xso Accordingly, advocates of Arti-
cle III status for bankruptcy judges have largely concluded that the true basis
for the judicial opposition is simply discriminatory self-interest without a jus-
tifiable basis.131
After Congress had removed provisions for an Article III court, at least
124Hearing on HR. 6109, supra note 66, at 2.
.2sGeraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress, and the Passage of the Bankruptcy Act of
1978 Part Three: On the Hill, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 341, 345-47 (2007) (noting that many were astonished
by the movement of Representatives within the House to "sell out" to the federal judges and remove the
Article III provision).
126Block-Lieb, supra note 2, at 89-91; McKenzie, supra note 63, at 760; Mund, supra note 126, at 346;
Peter Rodino & Alan A. Parker, The Simplest Solution, 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 329, 336 (1990); Countryman,
supra note 55, at 9; Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REV.
941, 954 (1979).
12 7See Linz Audain, The Economics of Law-Related Labor v: Judicial Careers, Judicial Selection, and an
Agency Cost Model of the Judicial Function, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 115, 120 (1992) (observing that the high
level of prestige associated with a federal judgeship has remained stable over the past seventy-five years).
But see Robert Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, Address at the National Conference
on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (April 7-9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D.
231, 234 (1976). Then Solicitor General Bork argued that, with the growth of the welfare states, the
burden on the courts to deal with increase in caselaw grew too great, and the burden could not simply be
alleviated by increasing the number of federal judgeships because '[1]arge numbers dilute prestige, a major
attraction of a career on the bench, and make it harder to recruit first-rate lawyers." Id.
m'Mund, supra note 125, at 357.
2'Rodino & Parker, supra note 126, at 333. In addition, there is some question as to whether the
Judicial Conference's input, publishing a report through its administrative arm, was at all appropriate.
Block-Lieb, supra note 2, at 71-72.
"oJeffrey J. Rachlinski et. al., Inside the Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1227, 1229 (2006).
However, as this study found, there is some correlation between bankruptcy judges' political views and
outcomes, suggesting that specialization may also serve to politicize the bench. Id. at 1231. In other
respects, the results indicated only that bankruptcy judges were no more influenced by factors such as
anchoring and framing than other general judges.
"'For an excellent argument that denial of Article III status is based on the cultural context of debt
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in part due to the political expediency of passing the bill before the 95th
Congress adjourned,132 the arguably inevitable finding of unconstitutional-
ityn13 came in the form of the fractured Marathon ruling. At this point Con-
gress had another opportunity to self-correct; in the words of one participant
in the legislative hearings, "[i]t was clear from the beginning [ ] that multiple
alternatives were nonexistent. . . . Witness after witness testified that there
were no alternatives . . . . [C]onferring Article III status to bankruptcy
courts was the only solution."134 In spite of this testimony, Congress "stead-
fastly refused to grant bankruptcy courts Article III status." 35 When Con-
gress adopted BAFJA instead, proponents of the Article III solution derided
the jurisdictional amendment as "invalid . . . and . . . unworkable,"' 36 with the
propensity to add to theoretical confusion and provide new opportunities for
delay in the form of jurisdictional objections to bankruptcy proceedings.'1 7
Congress' effort to give bankruptcy courts "as much (but no more) final adju-
dicatory powers as are constitutionally permissible" outside of Article 111,138
requires careful line drawing and invites constitutional challenges.
The ongoing constitutional uncertainty regarding the limits of the bank-
ruptcy courts' authority hung "like the sword of Damocles," pending a final
resolution by the Supreme Court.139  These concerns would ultimately be
played out in Stern, confirming the worst fears of many advocates of the
Article III solution.14o In the meantime, however, the system also promoted
a sense of injustice through its treatment of bankruptcy judges as less-than-
equal members of the judiciary,141 and some argued that lack of life tenure led
and the history of bankruptcy legal practice by minorities in 'bankruptcy rings," see Coco, supra note 57,
at 184.
"
2 Klee, supra note 126, at 955.
"'James F. Martin, The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal judgeship Act of 1984: A Step Back-
ward in Reducing jurisdictional Delay, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 219, 222 (1985) ("This attempt to place
form over substance was not destined to withstand constitutional attack.").
134King, supra note 123, at 108-09; see also Hearing on H.R. 6109, supra note 66, at 89 (statement of
Dean Gandy indicating that every lawyer organization representing attorneys who practice before the
bankruptcy court has unanimously taken the position that Article III status must be given to the bank-
ruptcy courts); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. Decision: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 248 (1983) (Lawrence King speaking
on behalf of the National Bankruptcy Conference noting that an Article III court is the only real alterna-
tive for dealing with Marathon)(hereinafter cited as "Hearing Before the Subcomm."); Bankruptcy Court
Act of 1983: Hearing on H.R. 3 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. (1983) (hereinafter cited as "Hearing on H.R. 3").
issMartin, supra note 133, at 219.
i"6King, supra note 123, at 116.
is7Martin, supra note 133, at 219.
i"8Brubaker, supra note 47, at 135.
islBlock-Lieb, supra note 8, at 545.
140See e.g., Block-Lieb, supra note 2, at 117 (noting that it is "only a matter of time" before another
constitutional crisis arises on the order of Marathon).
141See Jennifer M. D'Angelo, If Tou Can't Beat Them, Join Them: Inclusive Joinder and the Filtering of
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to other harmful effects. Most notably, Lynn LoPucki has argued that each
individual bankruptcy judge's need for favorable reception in the bankruptcy
community to ensure reappointment has created an incentive for bankruptcy
judges to compete for large chapter 11 cases, to the point that the courts
have become corrupted.142 In addition, the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission expressed concerns that the lack of Article III status made it
more difficult to attract the most qualified candidates to the bankruptcy
bench. 143
In the post-Stern era, proponents of the Article III plan continue to argue
for, in effect, a return to 1978, and the righting of a historic error.144 In a
recent statement to the House Judiciary Committee, the Honorable Joan N.
Feeney, Bankruptcy Judge for the District of Massachusetts, spoke on behalf
of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges regarding options for re-
sponding to Stern. First, she suggested that Congress could rely on case law
and procedural rulemaking, but noted that this would lead to a lack of uni-
formity. Second, she noted that Congress could amend § 157 to remove
counterclaims from the list of core proceedings, or require bankruptcy judges
to submit a report and recommendation rather than a final order, or permit
bankruptcy judges to issue final orders when parties consent. Each of these
resolutions would fail to finally resolve the issue, and would "only add perma-
nence and legitimacy to the current problem."'14 Judge Feeney then argued
for the Article III solution, explaining the conclusions of the House Commit-
tee back in 1977, referencing the "growing number of voices" calling for the
solution since BAFJA in 1984, and finally quoting the 1997 report of the
NBRC: "Article III status is not a panacea, but it is a miracle cure for the
majority of jurisdictional ills that currently afflict the bankruptcy court."146
Such an assessment of the need for reform in the bankruptcy system "rings as
Article III Status Into the Bankruptcy Courts, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 603 (2005-2006) ('the interests
of fairness and justice favor the promotion of bankruptcy judges to Article III status").
"'LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION POR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING
THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 20-21 (Univ. of Michigan Press 2005); Lynn M. LoPucki, Where Do Tou Get
Off7 A Reply to Courting Failure's Critics, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 511, 517-18 (2006) (defending use of word
choice). This argument has proved extremely provocative, with many questioning LoPucki's conclusion
and his means of presentation. See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & David. A. Skeel, Jr., An Efficiency-Based Expla-
nation for Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 427-28 (2006); Douglas G.
Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Beyond Recidivism, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 343, 344-45 (2006); Charles J. Tabb,
Courting Controversy, 54 BUFF. L. REv. 467, 470-71, 479-81 (2006). As demonstrated by the critics,
LoPucki's conclusions do not reflect the personal experience of many practitioners.
143Brunstad, supra note 8, at 1440.
144See, e.g., Lockman, supra note 22, at 166 ("The first, and most obvious, solution is to confer Article
III status on bankruptcy judges. This "solution" has been offered dozens of times by various members of
the bankruptcy bar, as well as academics alike.").
14 'Feeney, supra note 15, at 359.
'
4 6Id. at 400 (quoting NAT'L BANKR. REV. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 742
(1997)).
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true today in the wake of Stern v. Marshall as it did fifteen years ago."1 47
B. AGAINST: AN UNNECESSARY COMPLICATION
There are some who have argued against making bankruptcy judges Arti-
cle III judges. These arguments, generally made after Marathon but before
Stern, have been based on the premise that alteration of the bankruptcy sys-
tem is not constitutionally required. Presumably, the proponents of these
arguments have consequently been compelled to reconsider their conclusions.
For example, before Stern, Troy McKenzie argued that the bankruptcy court
was constitutional as constructed by virtue of the fact that bankruptcy
judges exhibit "Article III values," including autonomy and independence
from political pressure by virtue of their appointment process.148 After
Stern, McKenzie criticized the court's decision on the grounds that its argu-
ments regarding historical justification, expertise, and separation of powers
fail to provide meaningful guidance and may even be misleading, leaving the
law even more unsettled and uncertain.149
Erwin Chemerinsky also argued, pre-Stern, that subsequent case law
demonstrated that the ruling in Marathon was a mistake, and bankruptcy
courts are compatible with both due process and the separation of powers
doctrine.s5o In fact, he argued, the public nature of bankruptcy judges' deci-
sions, the merit-basis for their selection, and their specialization all indicated
that Article III independence was not necessary for bankruptcy judges to be
constitutional decision-makers.15i Post-Stern, Chemerinsky has complained
that
[t]he only way to understand Stern v. Marshall is to see it
as a very formalistic application of legal rules that have de-
veloped over more than a century and a half concerning
when Congress can vest judicial matters in non-Article III
judges. On examination, these rules make little sense and so
application of them in a formalistic way likewise is inher-
ently unsatisfying.152
147Feeney, supra note 15, at 400 (emphasis added).
'
4
sMcKenzie, supra note 63, at 793. For thinking along similar lines post-Stern, see Jolene Tanner,
Stern v. Marshall: The Earthquake That Hit the Bankruptcy Courts and the Aftershocks That Followed, 45
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 587, 611 (2012) (arguing that if bankruptcy judges were appointed under Article III the
appointment process would become more politicized and less efficient).
'
49McKenzie, supra note 19, at 27.
isoErwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Marathon: It Is Time To Overrule Northern Pipeline, 65 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 311, 311-12 (1991) ("Perhaps . . . Congress should convert these courts into Article III
tribunals[;] ... my point is only that the Constitution is not offended by broad jurisdiction in Article I
bankruptcy courts.").
"'Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Makers: In Defense of Courts, 71 AM. BANKR. LJ. 109, 127 (1997).
15'Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 185.
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He has also argued that Article III status is the most obvious solution to the
problem the Supreme Court has created in Stern. 53
Others have gone further, arguing not only that Article III status was
unnecessary for bankruptcy judges to be constitutional, but also that it was
undesirable. For example, in his pre-Stern article, Thomas Plank expressed
skepticism regarding the benefits of appointing bankruptcy judges under Ar-
ticle III, and argued instead that Article I bankruptcy judges fill an important
role in preserving constitutional limits by forcing Congress to ensure that
bankruptcy laws fell within its power under the Bankruptcy Clause.'54 Cit-
ing occasions in which solvent debtors have used bankruptcy as a means to
thwart state judgments, he argued "[m]aking bankruptcy judges Article III
judges removes an important constraint on Congress's temptation to exceed
its bankruptcy power." 55
Richard Fallon has also argued for continued use of non-Article III courts
on policy grounds. In his 1988 work regarding Article III's relationship to
legislative courts and administrative agencies, he lists "values supporting dele-
gation to non-Article III bodies."156 These include the ability to tap special-
ized expertise, the efficient management of governmental functions; and
"flexibility in adapting a scheme of administration and adjudication to chang-
ing needs and political priorities." 5 7 Weighing these values against "Article
III values" of separation-of-powers, due process, and judicial integrity, 58 he
concludes that both may be satisfied by a system in which non-Article III
tribunals are subject to strong appellate review.159 Fallon's recognition of the
benefits of "flexibility" inherent in non-Article III tribunals is a nod to the
reality demonstrated by the history of bankruptcy law that the purposes of
any legal scheme may change over time, in response to changing preferences,
strategies, and goals. Establishing bankruptcy judges under Article III with
life tenure would significantly damage this flexibility.
In a recent ABI Joint Session Douglas Baird raised what appears to be the
only written statement thus far that defends the merits of the Stern decision
and disapproves of an Article III solution.160 Pointing out that authorizing
1s3Erwin Chemerinsky, Non-Article III Courts: Problems of Principle and Practice, Remarks at the
2013 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools (Jan. 6, 2013).
I 4 Plank, supra note 15, at 629.
"Id. To my knowledge, Plank has not published a relevant article following the Stern decision.




9 Id. at 943.
"sAfter this article was drafted, but prior to publication, Rafael Pardo and Kathryn Watts published
an excellent piece that reached substantially the same conclusions as this article, albeit with a much dimin-
ished emphasis on the Stern ruling. In their work, Pardo and Watts argue that shifting from the current
bankruptcy structure toward an administrative model with a regulatory agency would bring greater exper-
tise, accountability, uniformity, accessibility, transparency, prospective clarity, and flexibility to policymak-
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the recovery of a debt by one citizen against another citizen is the very busi-
ness that Article III courts are about, he suggests that "those who downplay
the connection between traditional common law causes of action and the
exercise of the judicial power fail to understand what is at stake."'61 He nods
to the argument that "[t]he easiest way to put Marathon and Stern behind
us is to make bankruptcy judges ordinary Article III judges," but also notes
that "this course is not necessarily one that is good for the bankruptcy sys-
tem."162 In particular, Baird voices concerns over the political infeasibility of
the move, the transitional problems that would inevitably arise, and the likeli-
hood that a specialized and well-qualified bench of Article I bankruptcy
judges would be replaced by a more politically connected bench of Article III
bankruptcy judges.163
C. NEED FOR A BROADER PERSPECTIVE
Separate from its status as the majority position, the argument for Article
III status is compelling in its own right, particularly given the historical de-
velopment of the bankruptcy system. Bankruptcy commissioners,164 turned
referees, turned judges, have steadily developed over time in authority and
responsibility, to the point that they now are the near-exclusive arbiters over
a stunning number of cases; the number of bankruptcy filings processed each
year by the bankruptcy system dwarfs all other categories in the federal sys-
tem.'65 Legislative history strongly suggests that Congress recognized the
need for an independent bankruptcy judge with broad jurisdictional power,
but simply could not push such a system through the political resistance.
But seen in another light, this narrative seems to be captured by Hume's
Guillotine, suggesting that because the system is by and large structured in a
way that anticipates a bankruptcy judge with authority and discretion com-
mensurate with Article III status, this is the way that it ought to be.166
There are valid arguments for establishing the system in this way; such or-
ing, in addition to alleviating some of the constitutional issues in the current system. See Pardo & Watts,
supra note 6, at 384. Their recommendations are discussed in greater detail infra p. 171.
I'5 Douglas G. Baird, The Powers and Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court: Reconsidering an Article III







6 4This was the term given to assistants appointed by judges to administer the estate in the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1800. Ch. 9, § 2, 2 Stat. 19 (1800) (repealed 1803). These individuals were also termed
"assignees" in the 1841 Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, § 3, 5 Stat. 440 (1841) (repealed 1843), and "registers" in
the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 3, 14 Stat. 517 (1867) (repealed 1878).
1651n 2011 there were 1,467,221 bankruptcy filings, compared with 289,252 federal civil cases and
78,440 federal criminal cases. 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 26, at tbl.12.
166See 2 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE pt. 1, § 2, at 469 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896) (1888).
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ganization satisfies the view of bankruptcy as a federal system with its own
policy goals. However, it conflicts with the strategic goals of those who
view bankruptcy as a purely procedural mechanism, and recognition of this
conflict is strikingly absent from the dialogue.167
IV. A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO THE BANKRUPTCY
SYSTEM
As demonstrated above, most authors, in recommending the Article III
solution to the problem raised in Stern, approach the issue of bankruptcy
jurisdiction from a historical perspective. Noting the concerns raised by the
summary/plenary distinction, the progression of bankruptcy judges and their
increase in authority, and the political reasons for establishing bankruptcy
courts under Article I rather than Article III, proponents of the Article III
solution make a strong case that the rational response to the predictable com-
plications of the current system is to simply return to what was initially
intended.
However, taking a step back from the history of the bankruptcy courts
and looking strategically at the bankruptcy system reveals that the Article III
solution fails to consider important strategic objections. For example, it pre-
supposes that specialization and significant judicial involvement in bank-
ruptcy cases is desirable, even though other legal areas, such as employment
law or environmental law, operate without specialized courts. This paper
goes beyond these presuppositions and considers the problem from a fresh
perspective, by analyzing bankruptcy as a system168 and applying scholarly
principles of business and organization restructuring to that system. This
section will review three basic principles of restructuring, and then apply
those principles using the two primary ideologies at play in bankruptcy schol-
arship today.
A. BAsIc PRINCIPLES OF RESTRUCTURING
1. Step One: Perceived Strategic Opportunity
Before a dramatic change in organization should be attempted, there must
be a presenting problem and a perceived opportunity. 169 Identifying each can
help ensure the motives for restructuring and opportunities to be pursued are
"'Even the 1973 Commission's initial recommendation for an Article III court lacks a strong strategic
rationale. Under the subtitle "The Need for a Bankruptcy Court," the report relies largely on the fact that
bankruptcy has "traditionally . . . been administered by the courts" and rejects the Brookings Report's
recommendation for administrative courts primarily on separation-of-powers arguments. COMM'N ON
BANKR. LAWS, supra note 58, at 87-88.
is'See LoPucki, supra note 70, at 481.
'
6 9 CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGE
MENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS 69 (1996).
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correct.o70 A different approach to restructuring is warranted depending on
the underlying motives for restructuring. For example, if the push for re-
structuring came from a desire to increase the pay or prestige of bankruptcy
judges,171 we would consider a different strategic path than if the driving
force was the need to manage a dramatic increase in filings.
The presenting problem is what creates the need for change, sufficient to
shake off organizational inertia and invest in the inevitable costs and disrup-
tion that will result. In this case, the presenting problem has arguably been
in place for over thirty years, beginning with the decision in Marathon that
challenged the jurisdictional structure established in 1978. However, the Su-
preme Court's ruling in Stern represents a more pressing problem because
time has not yet dulled its effects.
In order for participants to buy into the costs of change, there must also
be a perceived opportunity for improvement within the system, such as
preventing future conflicts or otherwise improving the organization.1 72
Much of the drive behind calls for restructuring the current bankruptcy sys-
tem comes from the perceived opportunity to simplify the administrative pro-
cess and reduce costs, avoiding the "jurisdictional ping-pong" between
bankruptcy and district courts. In addition to these problems, there is a
growing concern regarding the potential expansion of Stern's reasoning into
additional areas within bankruptcy judges' core jurisdiction, leading to even
greater delays and uncertainty.173
2. Step Two: Strategic Direction
Having identified the fallout of Stern and concerns regarding its future
implications as the motivation for restructuring the bankruptcy system, the
next step is to engage in an assessment of the organization, identifying its goal
or mission.'74 This step is crucial; organizers must come to a clear realization
'
70BENGT KARLOF & FREDRIK HELIN LOVINCSSON, REORGANIZATION 132-133 (2005). The authors
suggest that businesses considering reorganization should first consider the motives for the proposed
change and diagnosis of the problem. See STUART C. GILsoN, CREATING VALUE THROUGH CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURING: CASE STUDIES IN BANKRUPTCIES, BUYOUTS, AND BREAKUPS 6 (2001) ('Restructuring
is more likely to be successful when managers first understand the fundamental business/strategic problem
or opportunity that their company faces.").
i7 iEvidence suggests that this is not the motivation for any organized drive for restructuring of the
bankruptcy system. In fact, an informal study performed in 2005 indicated that most bankruptcy judges
were generally satisfied with their level of prestige, and observed a positive trend during the course of
their tenure towards greater equality with federal district judges. Ralph R. Mabey, The Evolving Bank-
ruptcy Bench: How Are the 'Units" Faring?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 105, 118 (2005). In my personal experience,
bankruptcy judges apply for their positions based on a keen interest in bankruptcy law, and are relatively
unconcerned with prestige.
17 2 COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 169, at 70.
i7 'See discussion infra Part III.
17 4 COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 169, at 97; KARLOF & LOVINGSSON, supra note 170, at
67. Karl6f and Lovingsson go on to note: 'We have come across situations where organization seemed to
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of the organization's strategy and refine that strategy if necessary, before
making changes.1 75 Reformers already familiar with their subject and impa-
tient to reach a solution may be tempted to skip this step, particularly in
periods of crisis or when the window of opportunity for change is perceived
to be narrow. However, even in these situations, analysis regarding the sys-
tem's overall strategy is essential and may conserve effort: coming to a firm
conclusion regarding the ideological basis or business model may even lead
managers to conclude that restructuring would not resolve the underlying
problem. This realization can help managers avoid the expense and disrup-
tion of unnecessary restructuring.176 One study concluded that most busi-
ness reorganizations fall flat precisely because the reorganizers failed to take
into account business strategy before embarking on major structural
changes.177 The observations of Karl6f and L6vingsson regarding businesses
are applicable broadly: "A business should be organized according to its orien-
tation, which is why any organizational change should involve decisions on
the organization's vision, strategies and business mission."178
Identifying a single comprehensive goal or mission for the bankruptcy sys-
tem is elusive, in large part because of the complexities of insolvency law and
the different consequences for its implementation, both on individuals and on
businesses. Although many have considered this question, there is little con-
sensus.' 79 In its report to Congress, the 1973 Commission on the Bank-
ruptcy Laws of the United States8 0 conducted its own analysis of the
philosophical basis for the bankruptcy act, concluding that "[t]he primary
function of the bankruptcy system is to continue the law-based orderliness of
the open credit economy," even when debtors cannot or will not pay their
debts.181 To this effect, the 1973 Commission listed four principal goals,
including (1) open access for both debtors and creditors to the bankruptcy
be the goal, rather than the means to a goal. Although it may be a truism to say that an organization is
started or reorganized in order to further its aims, this is forgotten more often than we would care to
remember." Id.
'"Alan Brache, Company Reorganization: Does the Medication Treat the Disease?, USA TODAY, May
1, 2001, at 30.
'
76 KARLOF & LOVINOSSON, supra note 170, at 135.
'
77Marcia W. Blenko, Michael C. Mankins, & Paul Rogers, The Decision-Driven Organization,
HARVARD Bus. REv. 54 (June 2010) at 56 (A recent Bain & Company study of 57 reorgs between 2000
and 2006 found that fewer than one-third produced any meaningful improvement in performance. Most
had no effect, and some actually destroyed value.").
"'KARLOF & LOVINGSSON, supra note 170, at 133.
'
79See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MicH. L. REV. 336, 336-
38 (1993) (noting that complaints about the bankruptcy system are rooted in debates over underlying
premises).
'See COMM'N ON BANKR. LAWS, supra note 59, at 1 (The Commission was established in 1970 by
Public Law 91-354 (84 Stat. 468) to "study, analyze, evaluate, and recommend changes" to the Bankruptcy
Act in place at that time.).
'IId. at 71.
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process; (2) fair and equitable treatment of creditors' claims; (3) rehabilitation
for debtors; and (4) efficient and economical case administration. This simple
list provides significant room for disagreement, particularly in implementa-
tion. For example, in regard to fair and equitable treatment of creditors'
claims, the 1973 Commission suggested that both distributive standards, tak-
ing into account the legal status of claims, and allocative standards, reflecting
the social and economic consequences of the burden of loss, should play a
role.18 2 These two principles seem to be in direct conflict; shifting the bur-
den of loss to the party "better able to bear it," as the 1973 Commission
suggests, must interfere with a creditors legal rights any time that creditor is
better able to bear the burden of loss than another party.
This dispute is one at the heart of the disagreements between procedural-
ists and traditionalists. Although there are clearly other philosophical ap-
proaches to debt and bankruptcy that could be used to create a
comprehensive strategy, these two have largely shaped discussions in bank,
ruptcy scholarship. 8a The principle ideologies underlying either group arise
most commonly in discussions of corporate reorganization, but they also come
into play in the context of consumer bankruptcy, 8 4 and are applicable to the
bankruptcy system at large. There are varying opinions within the two
camps, but the most widely read champions of these two competing view-
points are Elizabeth Warren, a traditionalist, and Douglas Baird, a procedural-
ist. For the sake of discussion, this paper will treat them as representatives of
each camp, and restrict analysis to their core concerns.185
Warren, in representing the "traditional" view, describes bankruptcy as
"an attempt to reckon with a debtor's multiple defaults and to distribute the
consequences among a number of different actors."186 She sees bankruptcy as
a system of collection similar to what exists at the state level, with the im-
portant distinction that bankruptcy takes into account (or should take into
account) the distributional effect of one creditor's collection on other credi-
tors and other actors, such as employees, suppliers, and the surrounding com-
munity.187 She notes, "Congress intended bankruptcy law to address
concerns broader than the immediate problems of debtors and their identified
creditors; they indicate clear recognition of the larger implications of a
debtor's widespread default and the consequences of permitting a few credi-
82Id. at 77.
1s3See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 13, at 4-5; Mooney, supra note 13, at 945-46.
1s4 See Hynes, supra note 12, at 123.
85 For purposes of simplicity, I evaluate restructuring of the bankruptcy system under just these two
viewpoints. Although there may be additional philosophical approaches worth pursuing, perhaps in an-
other work, they have not reached the level of broad acceptance and relevance attained by the procedural-
ist and traditionalist camps.
'
8 6Warren, supra note 13, at 777.
1a7Id. at 787-88.
AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL
tors to force a business to close."188 Overall, the traditional approach, as ex-
pressed by Warren, is one of introducing a new distributional scheme
through the federal system, one supervised by a bankruptcy judge with dis-
cretion to act in the best interests of that distributional scheme.'8 9
In contrast, the proceduralist point of view, as expressed by Baird, is that
applying a special set of distributional concerns in the case of bankruptcy is
difficult to justify, and may result in inappropriate "forum shopping" by debt-
ors.190 Baird expresses uncertainty as to why a distinct bankruptcy law ex-
ists at all in light of the costs inherent in maintaining two separate avenues of
debt collection.191 He particularly objects to providing bankruptcy judges
with broad discretion to address distributional problems, noting that
"[j]udges ordinarily do not play tennis without a net," and criticizing a bank-
ruptcy system in which "judges have a general mandate to do equity, but not
too much equity."192 His assertion, instead, is that "a single set of rules
should distribute losses that flow from a business failure."'19 Others scholars
approaching the topic with a similar philosophy have recommended that
bankruptcy serve as an extension of civil procedure, with the simple goal of
providing procedural protection to the interests of rightsholders in the event
of collective default. This goal primarily involves permitting preservation of
the estate, through the automatic stay, so that a maximum distribution under
the terms of applicable non-bankruptcy law may be achieved.194
3. Step Three: Restructuring Plan
Once the vision, strategies, and mission are identified, then the process of
developing a plan for restructuring can begin in earnest. There are different
approaches to this process, but all involve a critical analysis of the needs of
the organization. A persuasive line of reasoning embraced by leading scholars
in the field of business reorganization recommends a decision-driven approach
to restructuring. As they explain, "an organization's performance is really no
more and no less than the sum of the decisions it makes and executes....
[R]edesigning the org chart is almost always counterproductive if leaders fail
to think through what the critical decisions are for the business, whom
should be responsible for them, and how the new structure will help people
Id. at 788.
a Id. at 805.
"oBaird, supra note 12, at 819.
911d. at 824.
19218. at 832, 834.
193Id. at 822. See also Baird, supra note 11 (describing proceduralist beliefs as "(1) the preservation of
firms is not an independent good in itself; (2) ex ante effects are important; and (3) the judge, after control-
ling for the biases and weaknesses of the parties and resolving the legal disputes, must allow the parties to
make their own decisions and thereby choose their own destinies").
194See Mooney, supra note 12, at 933-34.
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make and execute them better."195 Others recommend looking at crucial bus-
iness processes critical to successful implementation of the organization's
strategy, and defining the organizational structure accordingly.196
As an initial matter, proceduralists and traditionalists disagree about
what types of decisions ought to be made in the bankruptcy system.
Whereas traditionalists believe that bankruptcy law should permit decisions
on a case-by-case basis as to who should bear the costs of a firm's failure,197
proceduralists believe such decisions should be made at the policy level, and
should be consistent, to the extent possible, both inside and outside of bank-
ruptcy.198 To the extent the structure of the bankruptcy system permits or
disallows decision-making in response to a particular case or set of claimants,
it will be more or less acceptable to either group.
As an extension of this disagreement about decisions, the two groups also
express different opinions as to the decision-makers. The bankruptcy system
as it currently stands largely revolves around one set of decision-makers: the
bankruptcy judges. It is the judges who make most of the important deci-
sions, particularly decisions that respond to the factual situation of any given
debtor or creditor. Not surprisingly, then, it is the authority, discretion, and
flexibility'99 of bankruptcy judges that provokes particular disagreement be-
tween proceduralists and traditionalists. Thus, an issue at the heart of re-
structuring is also a flashpoint of disagreement regarding the strategic mission
for the bankruptcy system. Under the strategic approach to restructuring,
traditionalists will generally favor the Article III solution to amending the
bankruptcy system in response to Stern, but such a solution runs counterin-
tuitive to proceduralist thought.
B. TRADITIONALIST REVISIONS
For traditionalists, giving bankruptcy judges lifetime tenure would re-
solve the constitutional conflict identified in Stem while preserving the sta-
tus quo in a way that is consistent with their general strategy: a specialized
system that distributes losses to those best able to bear them. Traditionalists
favor the current system because judges with specialized training and experi-
"sBlenko, Mankins & Rogers, supra note 177. Bain & Company identifies six lessons necessary for
companies launching a decision-driven restructuring, as follows: (1) Identify your organization's key deci-
sions, including major strategic decisions as well as operating decisions; (2) determine where in the organi-
zation those decisions need to be made; (3) structure the company around its sources of value; (4) figure
out the level of authority your decision makers need, and give it to them; (5) adjust other parts of your
organization system as necessary; and (6) equip your managers to make decisions quickly and well. BAIN &
Co., Organizational Design & Restructuring, BAIN & Co., www.bain.com/consulting-services/organiza-
tion/organizational-design.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
'
96Brache, supra note 175, at 30.
'97See Warren, supra note 13, at 785-86.
"
5 See Baird, supra note 12, at 822.
'
99See Levitin, supra note 13, at 5.
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ence in the area of bankruptcy are able to make quick and correct decisions,
taking into account the totality of the situation and applying federal common
law, with its underlying policy rationale. Delays necessitated by the need to
research particular issues are minimized, as the specialized bankruptcy judge
is likely to have previous experience on any given issue. Thus the system is
at once accomplishing its mission, facilitating decision-making, and minimizing
costs.
Further, a bankruptcy judge appointed under Article III and thereby able
to wield the "judicial power of the United States" would have the authority
and power necessary to hear and rule on all issues arising in the state court
connected with the bankruptcy, including all potential claims and assets in
the distribution calculation. Decisions regarding the fate of businesses could
always take into account all relevant issues if bankruptcy judges had full au-
thority to issue final orders in proceedings "related to" the case without the
need for party consent. Further, Article III status would increase the bank-
ruptcy judges' equitable authority, giving judges wider latitude to respond to
the specifics of any given situation.200 In this way, power to make the de-
sired decisions would be in the hands of the desired decision-makers, leading
to a more efficient system, with better decisions made in a shorter period of
time.201
Concerns tangential to the strategic success of this structure can be re-
solved. Administrative costs are unlikely to increase significantly with Arti-
cle III appointment, and such appointment may even result in a net reduction
of costs, once the efficiency costs of the jurisdictional ping-pong currently
required by the "core" and "non-core" categorizations are removed.2 02 There
is nothing in the Constitution that would require an increase in bankruptcy
judges' salaries or staff,203 nor an improvement in their chambers. Bank-
ruptcy judges are unlikely to serve significantly longer terms than they cur-
200Alan M. Ahart, The Limited Scope of Implied Powers of A Bankruptcy judge: A Statutory Court of
Bankruptcy, Not A Court of Equity, 79 AM. BANKR. LJ. 1, 12 (2005).
201BAIN & Co., Organizational Design & Restructuring, supra note 195.
20 2Costs are an Important concern in the current political climate. In fact, beyond simply managing
costs, there is currently a push to reduce costs introduced by the bankruptcy system, with Congress
approving only "temporary judgeships" even in busy judicial districts. Bruce Moyer, Lapses in Banlruptcy
Judgeships Threaten Turmoil, FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION (June 2012), available at http://
www.fedbar.org/Advocacy/Washington-Watch/WW-Archives/2012/June-2012-Lapses-in-Bankruptcy-
Judgeships-Threaten-Turmoil.aspx. Republican Senators have opposed extending permanent judgeships on
the argument that courts must use resources more efficiently. However, this argument may be driven
more from concerns about the strategic direction of the bankruptcy courts, and their federal jurisdiction,
than "efficiency" costs. As has been explained above, a system of Article I bankruptcy judges detracts
from judicial efficiency in both the need for reports and recommendations and the appeals process. A
system of temporary judgeships, which places districts at risk of losing judgeships in the event that a judge
leaves or retires, introduces greater uncertainty, and correspondingly, more inefficiency.
2 0 3 NATL BANKR. REV. COMM'N, supra note 10, at 723.
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rently do-fourteen years was chosen as the correct term in 1978 because it
was considered at that time to be the actuarial equivalent of a lifetime ap-
pointment.204 Arguably, life expectancy has increased since that determina-
tion was made,205 but it is also the case that the vast majority of bankruptcy
judges who seek reappointment are successful. 206 Retirement costs are un-
likely to increase significantly, as bankruptcy judges who have served full
terms are currently entitled to a lifetime annuity equal to the salary being
received at the time they leave office. 2 07
However, political costs must also be accounted for, and may be responsi-
ble for some of the resistance to Article III appointment. The United States
currently boasts over 350 bankruptcy judges.20s Bankruptcy, although a spe-
cialty area, deals with multiple constitutional and political issues. Permitting
one administration to preside over the lifetime appointment of over 350
judges would place an inordinate amount of power in the hands of that ad-
ministration. 209 However, there are multiple solutions to this problem, many
of which were raised in congressional hearings after Marathon.2 10 Lifetime
appointments could be spread over a period of sixteen years, permitting
judges who are currently at the beginning of their fourteen year terms to
serve through the end, and appointing Article III judges as terms are com-
pleted. Alternatively, a system could be derived whereby each Senator
would sponsor a group of would-be appointees for his or her state, with an
agreement that neither party would attempt to block the other party's
appointees. 211
Congress might instead appoint a single Article III bankruptcy judge in
each of the 94 judicial districts, who would refer cases to all other Article I
bankruptcy judges within the district.212  When needed, this Article III
20 4Block-Lieb, supra note 2, at 91.
20
sORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD Health Data 2012,
(June 28, 2012), http://www.oecd.org/els/healthpoliciesanddata/oecdhealthdata20l2-frequentlyreques-
teddata.htm (last visited May 16, 2013) (reporting an average life expectancy for individuals in the United
States as 71.5 years in 1978, compared with 78.7 years in 2010).
206LOPUCKI, supra note 142, at 21 (citing a 2001 study by Stan Bernstein, The Reappointment of
Bankruptcy Judges: A Preliminary Analysis of the Present Process, that found less than 10% of judges who
applied for reappointment from 1998 to 2002 were not reappointed).
20728 U.S.C. § 377(a) (2012).
2082011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 26, at tbl.12.
"9This concern was one factor for the initial failure of Congress to pass legislation appointing bank-
ruptcy judges under Article III. See Mund, Part Three, supra note 125, at 357.
2 10Hearing on HR. 6109, supra note 66; Hearing Before the Subcomm., supra note 134; Hearing on H.R.
3, supra note 134.
211See also NAT'L BANKR. REV. COMM'N, supra note 10, at 718 (recommending a transition period
whereby sitting bankruptcy judges will be permitted to finish their terms, with Article III judges ap-
pointed as vacancies are created through attrition).
2 12This idea was first presented to me by Kenneth Klee, who extended his permission to include it in
this article. The suggestion has also been made by Richard Levin, The Transition to Article III Bank-
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bankruptcy judge could supply the judicial power needed to issue a final rul-
ing on another bankruptcy judge's report and recommendation. Further, the
Article III bankruptcy judge could be responsible for larger and more compli-
cated filings, analogous to the treatment of multi-district litigation. 213 This
solution would permit most bankruptcy judges to continue as they had, but
would still introduce the authority and power necessary within the bank-
ruptcy system for the system to process important decisions quickly and
efficiently.
Complaints regarding the authority of these judges, now afforded all the
power in law and equity granted by Article III,214 would be dismissed by
traditionalist thinkers, but are at the heart of proceduralist objections to such
a scheme.
C. PROCEDURALIST REVISIONS
From the proceduralist perspective, the solution to Stern is much more
complicated. To begin with, it is not at all certain that the desired fix can be
made simply by adjusting or tweaking the current bankruptcy system. Aca-
demics and professionals ensconced in the bankruptcy system tend to develop
a bias towards its use and look for solutions to many debtor/creditor issues in
the context of bankruptcy as we know it today. However, there is little to
suggest that this must, or even should be, where to look for answers in the
strategic approach to restructuring. 215
Proceduralists see little persuasive reason to treat individual rights differ-
ently inside federal bankruptcy than they would be treated under state
law,216 and prefer instead a minimalist approach to bankruptcy. Under this
approach, controlling non-bankruptcy law, whether it is individual state law,
comprehensive federal law, or a uniform code adopted by all states, should
also be applicable in bankruptcy insofar as it does not inhibit collective ac-
tion. Important decisions regarding debtor and creditor rights should be
ruptcy Courts, 38TH ANNUAL AM. BANKR. INST. WORKSHOP ON BANKR. AND BUSINESs REORGANIZA-
TION, Am. BANKR. INST. 336 (2012) and by Kuney, supra note 8. On a panel at the 2013 Annual
Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Thomas H. Lee also expressed the opinion that at
least a small group of bankruptcy judges should be appointed under Article III to deal with multi-district
litigation and other complex cases. Thomas H. Lee, Remarks at the 2013 Annual Meeting of the Associa-
tion of American Law Schools, Non-Article III Courts: Problems of Principle and Practice (Jan. 6, 2013).
2" See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012) (authorizing the transfer of multi-district litigation to a single district
for the convenience of parties and to promote the just and efficient conduct of the proceedings).
214Ahart, supra note 200, at 12.
215Costs of dramatically altering or even doing away with the current system must be acknowledged,
of course, including the costs imposed individuals within the current system, most prominently, bank-
ruptcy judges.
216Baird, supra note 11, at 588; Baird, supra note 12, at 823; Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson,
Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate
Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 100 (1984).
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made in the legislature, rather than the courts, and should be consistent.2 17
Proceduralist theory is generally agnostic as to what law should control,
so long as the same law applies in and out of bankruptcy. Acknowledging
that the federal Congress could hypothetically broaden its regulatory power
to all matters involving commerce, 2 18 it is more likely that states will con-
tinue to control the legal landscape in most areas linked to debt and collec-
tion. Accordingly, for proceduralists Stern should present an opportunity to
revise the system in a way that reduces federal influence and limits substan-
tive differences between the law applied in state collection proceedings and
in bankruptcy. 219
1. Repeal of Bankruptcy Law
In this vein, the most dramatic approach to the proceduralist agenda may
be to do away with federal bankruptcy law altogether, relying solely on state
law.2 20 As demonstrated historically, Congress may repeal bankruptcy laws
at will; Congressional authority to enact laws of bankruptcy does not require
that such a law be in place at any given time.2 2 1 However, doing away with
federal bankruptcy would undoubtedly be criticized as an overreaction to the
Stern problem, even within the proceduralist camp,222 in no small part be-
cause it would limit the discharge, particularly for consumer debtors. Be-
cause of constitutional limitations, states cannot discharge a debtor, a
conclusion reached long ago in a series of Supreme Court cases including
Golden v. Prince,2 2 3 Sturges v. Crowninshield,224 Ogden v. Saunders,225 and
Hanover National Bank v. Moyses. 2 2 6 Accordingly, any "fresh start" would
217See Baird, supra note 12, at 822 ("Legal rights should turn as little as possible on the forum in which
one person or another seeks to vindicate them.").
21
*Congress has broad authority "[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States." See U.S.
CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA
L. REv. 1353, 1362 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Raich gave Congress "almost
as expansive an account of federal power under the Commerce Clause as could be imagined").
2 19True consistency might not be accomplished through mere structural reform. To the extent there
are two separate forums for debt collection and bankruptcy, many concerns regarding inconsistent treat-
ment between creditors in and out of bankruptcy would need to be managed by amending substantive
bankruptcy law.
220See Barry E. Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 811, 811 (1994); Hynes, supra note
12.
221See generally Tabb, supra note 54, at 14-23.
22 2Baird, supra note 17, at 174 ("The reason for engaging in this thought experiment is not that it is
either wise or at all likely that we abandon bankruptcy law. I think neither is the case.").
22310 F. Cas. 542, 546 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814).
'2217 U.S. 122 (1819).
22525 U.S. 213, 264 (1827). For an interesting discussion of this case and what it has to say regarding
the nature of contracts, see Robert E. Shapiro, Back to the Future: Ogden v. Saunders, 27 LITIGATION 73
(2001).
226186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902) ("'So long as there is no national bankrupt act, each state has full author-
ity to pass insolvent laws binding persons and property within its jurisdiction, provided it does not impair
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require the consent of all creditors. While this is theoretically common in
cases of business reorganization today, a significant number of reorganizations
would be rendered impossible due to the refusal of key creditors to consent
to a reduction of their claims. One way of mitigating the damage caused by
the lack of discharge to personal debtors might be to expand laws regarding
exemptions or restrict the ability to garnish future wages. 2 2 7
Another concern is that transferring all insolvency cases to the state
courts would result in the termination of thousands of federal bankruptcy
employees and the simultaneous increase of the state courts' burden in deal-
ing with insolvent debtors. Proceedings surrounding debt collection in the
state courts could multiply, provoking a significant increase in workload and
possibly requiring the appointment of new state court judges and staff. How-
ever, it is unclear how dramatic this increase would be.228 Presumably a
significant portion of unsecured creditors would consider it a waste of time
and effort to pursue debtors plagued by collective default - most debtors in
chapter 7 have no non-exempt assets for distribution in any scenario - and so
would take no action outside ordinary efforts of dunning or transferring the
debt to collection agencies. Without empirical evidence on this point, the
best that can be said is that some administrative costs for insolvency would
be effectively transferred from the federal government to the states, but it is
unclear whether those costs would be significant.
Although extreme, the suggestion that we might do away with federal
bankruptcy laws has been defended in the context of corporate bankrupt-
cies, 2 29 and has some historical basis. Bankruptcy has only become a stable
element within the federal system within the last hundred years. 2 3 0 At least
in cases where a discharge is not required, state remedies and private negotia-
tion may prove to be sufficient, particularly in light of modern trends towards
pre-negotiated or "pre-packaged" bankruptcies. 23 1
2. Return to Summary/Plenary Jurisdiction
A less dramatic proposal might be to simply reduce the authority and
discretion of a bankruptcy judge to levels that are both clearly constitutional
the obligation of existing contracts; but a state cannot by such a law discharge one of its own citizens from
his contracts with citizens of other states . .. .' (quoting Brown v. Smart, 145 U.S. 454, 457 (1892))).
227See Baird, supra note 17, at 178.
228MOst consumer bankruptcy filings cause only a temporary delay in foreclosure proceedings as a
consequence of the automatic stay. Other cases involving garnishment and wage execution may be re-
solved in the course of bankruptcy, but the number of these actions is comparatively small. Additional
empirical research is necessary on this point.
229See David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Link Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72
TEX. L. REV. 471, 475 (1994).
230See generally Tabb, supra note 54, at 14-23.
231 Lisa G. Beckerman et. al, Need For Speed: Prepackaged and Prenegotiated Bankruptcy Plans, 17TH
ANNUAL NORTHEAST BANKR. CONP., AM. BANKR. INST. (July 8, 2010).
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and consistent with proceduralist strategy for bankruptcy. Instead of a judi-
cial official, endowed with discretion to alter creditors' rights in ways that
would not be permitted outside of bankruptcy, proceduralists might prefer an
administrator 232 with limited authority to supervise the liquidation of firms
and the negotiation between debtors and creditors. Corporate reorganiza-
tions and other bankruptcy filings 2 3 3 could either be managed pursuant to
state law,2 3 4 or by district court judges. 2 35
With regards to the jurisdictional authority of the bankruptcy adminis-
trator, a return to the summary/plenary jurisdictional distinction is probably
the least complicated option consistent with proceduralists' strategic goals.
This framework would permit summary proceedings, such as adjudication of
creditor's claims against the estate2 3 6 and issuance of the discharge, to be
determined by the bankruptcy administrator. All other proceedings would
be heard by state court judges or Article III federal judges. The primary
advantage of the summary/plenary jurisdictional model is that its constitu-
tionality has been clearly established. 237
For this proposal to be workable, it would have to overcome the weak-
nesses demonstrated by the original summary/plenary jurisdictional scheme,
in place from 1898 to 1978. As explained above, the primary concern with
this model was the uncertainty surrounding what could be decided by the
bankruptcy referee and what could not. Accordingly, the jurisdictional
boundaries of the bankruptcy administrator would have to be clearly deline-
ated, incorporating precedential line-drawing to the extent relevant. The de-
lay inherent in the summary/plenary model, which necessarily divides more
232The most likely candidate for an administrative program is the current United States Trustee
Program, a component of the United States Department of Justice, which currently operates in all districts
except Alabama and North Carolina, see Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer
Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 302(d)(3)(A), (E), 100 Stat. 3038, 3121-22 (amended 1990
and 2000), or the Bankruptcy Administrators Program, a functionary of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, which operates in the two states mentioned above.
2.3 Presumably, municipal bankruptcies under chapter 9 and cross-border cases under chapter 15 would
be heard by the district court. Farm and fisherman bankruptcies under chapter 12 could be heard by
either the administrator or the district court, depending on the dollar amount at issue.
234See Skeel, supra note 229, at 475.
235The desirability of a federal system of corporate reorganization is a subject of debate among those
who express proceduralist leanings. See Baird, supra note 16, at 127-128 ("[T]he entire law of corporate
reorganizations is hard to justify under any set of facts and virtually impossible when the debtor is a
publicly held corporation"); James W. Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy
Theory, and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REV. 27, 69 (1991); Michael Bradley
& Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L. J. 1043, 1078 (1992) (proposing
the repeal of chapter 11 and the use of federal law cancelling residual claims in the event of default); David
A. Skeel, Jr. Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 465,
468-69 (1993). Further exploration of this issue is beyond the scope of this article.
'
36See Brubaker, supra note 47, at 128.
237See id. at 122.
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complex cases, with the administrator acting on some proceedings, and the
courts on others, is unlikely to be resolved, but could be ameliorated in two
ways. First, parties could consent to plenary actions being determined by the
administrator, as was the case under the 1898 Act.238 Second, district courts
could allow for "fast-track" pleading in bankruptcy cases, whereby movants
could place a case directly in the district court, skipping over the administra-
tor altogether, upon a showing that complicated plenary issues would inevita-
bly arise, and the case otherwise warranted federal review.
Generally speaking, the en masse dismissal of bankruptcy judges in favor
of authority transferred to bankruptcy administrators would require a dra-
matic shift in how bankruptcy cases are handled, similar to the shift that took
place with the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. State courts would
again be called upon to bear much of the burden of insolvency proceedings,
and would suddenly become responsible for a high volume of adversary pro-
ceedings; at the very least, state courts would determine all state matters
currently listed as "non-core," to the extent parties did not consent to have
them heard before the administrator. Further, based on current case law,
state courts would also likely hear counterclaims by the estate against a cred-
itor who had filed a proof of claim, and all fraudulent conveyance actions.239
Bankruptcy administrators, on the other hand, would likely spend the bulk of
their time ruling on motions for relief from the automatic stay, discharges,
sales, and other matters concerning administration of the estate property. 2 40
In these matters, administrators would be guided by carefully drafted regula-
tions that did not permit or encourage variations from case to case.
Either proceduralist solution proposed here-the disavowal of federal bank-
ruptcy law altogether or a return to the summary/plenary distinction241 -
would discourage case-by-case decisions regarding asset distribution, and in
any event would place decision-making largely in the hands of state court
"'This presupposes that consent is a valid workaround to issues of Article III jurisdiction, a matter
still subject to debate. See supra note 96.
239For purposes of avoiding litigation over jurisdiction, it would likely be preferable to draw a clear
line at the nature of the proceeding, without taking into consideration, for example, whether resolution of
the proceeding was "integral to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship," Lanigenkamp v. Culp,
498 U.S. 42, 44 (1990), or qualified as a public right. Efficiency in some case administration might thus be
sacrificed for a clearer jurisdictional standard. For example, there could be cases where one party might
benefit from all proceedings being heard in the same forum, but the other party would not consent to the
administrator's jurisdiction. However, the system as a whole would benefit from clear line-drawing, as an
inoculation against costly litigation over jurisdiction. This model is also more consistent with the
proceduralist approach, which strategically prefers a greater percentage of matters being heard before state
courts, outside of bankruptcy.
24 1t is unlikely that these motions could be handled outside of the bankruptcy court because of the
complications inherent in permitting two different courts to each exercise jurisdiction over the same res.
241There is at least some speculation that this is the direction in which the Supreme Court has sig-
naled it will head. See Brubaker, supra note 47, at 122.
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judges, thereby limiting the impact of bankruptcy law on creditor rights. Ei-
ther solution would also likely reduce the ability to reorganize firms without
creditor consent. Without bankruptcy courts, debtors would lose access to
the one-stop-shop, the delay itself a likely death sentence to any contested
reorganization, and the availability of informed, impartial decision-makers
who are trained to make decisions consistent with the distributional goals of
bankruptcy. 242 Although many might find such consequences highly objec-
tionable, for proceduralists, these changes are neutral if not favorable; the
more important consideration is the consistency of position, power, and treat-
ment of creditors in and outside of bankruptcy.
V. THE STRATEGIC APPROACH TO "UNIFORM"
BANKRUPTCY LAW
A. OBJECTIONS TO TRADITIONALIST AND PROCEDURALIST
SOLUTIONS
As suggested above, both the strategic approach of the traditionalists and
that of the proceduralists would be repugnant to the other camp. Tradition-
alists would strongly object to reducing the authority or propensity of courts
sitting in bankruptcy to consider all the facts surrounding a debtor's failure.
From their perspective, many of the important policy benefits of bankruptcy
would be lost in a system where states issued rulings related to collective
default. On the other hand, proceduralists would object to promoting bank-
ruptcy judges to Article III status, because doing so would perpetuate and
even exacerbate concerns already in place that bankruptcy practice needlessly
and harmfully creates a double standard for firms that fail: rightsholders may
expect one kind of treatment inside bankruptcy, and quite another outside
bankruptcy. This leads to forum shopping concerns and the creation of pol-
icy outside the public sphere at large, stemming instead from bankruptcy
practitioners.243 At their core, traditionalists' distributional goals are ham-
pered by a proceduralist system, and proceduralists' goals of consistency are
undermined by a traditionalist system.
There are other concerns with the implementation of either approach.
Should decision making in insolvency be passed off to state courts entirely
through a proceduralist solution, extra steps would be required to maintain
some form of discharge, whether it be by limiting creditors' access to debtors'
assets, shortening the statute of limitations for collection, or something else.
Under the summary/plenary model, there could also be cause for concern if
state courts were called to rule on claims that crossed state boundaries,
namely the risk of bias against out-of-state creditors in favor of local debtors
242See Warren, supra note 13, at 805.
243Mooney, supra note 12, at 1000-01.
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or creditors. Congress would have to carefully draft venue provisions to re-
duce such concerns. 2 4 4
On the other hand, appointing specialized bankruptcy judges to lifetime
positions under a traditionalist plan would solidify the current bankruptcy
structure for at least one lifetime. The costs of restructuring the bankruptcy
system, already high, would prove even higher and likely insurmountable,
even in the event that public opinion regarding bankruptcy, the structure of
credit, or any number of other relevant factors changed. An Article III bank-
ruptcy court would likely be a permanent anomaly within the federal sys-
tem.2 4 5 Bankruptcy law is not so distinctive as to require such unique status
in the federal system; if a specialized Article III bankruptcy court is justified,
why not a specialized trial court for environmental law, commercial law, pat-
ent law, or any other highly technical field?24 6 Unless such other specialized
courts are warranted247 in the interests of consistency in the federal sys-
tem,bankruptcy courts should not be distinct, specialized bodies.
B. UNIFORMITY AS A STRATEGIc GOAL
A specialized bankruptcy court is not required under a third strategic
approach advocated here. In drafting the Constitution, the Founding Fathers
identified an overarching strategic goal for bankruptcy; that of uniformity. 248
In succinct language characteristic of the Constitution's concise drafting, the
Founding Fathers assigned only a single modifier to Congress' authority to
pass laws of bankruptcy: the requirement that these laws be uniform.249 Yet,
this admonition has been largely forgotten in the formation of modern bank-
ruptcy law.2 5 0 Instead, academics and commentators have brought to bank-
ruptcy their own well-reasoned approaches and recommendations. While
these have their place, they should not operate to the exclusion of the strate-
gic goal encompassed in the Constitution.
Adopting uniformity as a strategic goal for the purposes of proposing a
24 4Such provisions could have the secondary benefit of reducing concerns regarding competition among
bankruptcy courts for large cases. See LOPUCKI, supra note 142, at 252.
24 5As noted above, supra note 18, there are currently only two specialized Article III courts in the
federal system. The International Court of Trade is a specialized trial court, and the Federal Circuit,
dealing exclusively with patent cases is, a specialized court of appeals.
2 46These specialized courts exist to some extent in various states, but in the federal system, bank-
ruptcy law stands out as an area with its own distinct court, albeit joined by the Tax Court and the Court
of Claims.
2 47Such a consideration, while deserving of more in-depth treatment, is outside the scope of this paper.
248See U.S. CONsT., art. 1, §8 cl.4.
2 49U.S. CONsT., art. 1, § 8.
250See Victor D. L6pez, State Homestead Exemptions and Bankruptcy Law: Is it Time for Congress to
Close the Loophole?, 7 RUTCERS Bus. LJ. 143, 166 (2010); Judith Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause
and Exemption Laws: A Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 22, 22
(1983).
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plan to restructure the system is also appropriate because of its broad applica-
tion to all facets of bankruptcy law. As noted above, the ideological ap-
proaches identified in this article, the traditionalist and the proceduralist
views, stem largely from considerations of corporate bankruptcy. 25 1 Most
authors, in adopting these viewpoints, acknowledge that an alternate ap-
proach may be warranted for consumer bankruptcies, 252 which make up the
overwhelming majority of cases filed within the system itself.2 sa In contrast,
the strategic goal of uniformity is appropriate in both the consumer and the
corporate context. For individual consumers, uniformity helps to ensure
equal treatment under the law, another protection guaranteed to individuals
by the Constitution.254 For businesses, uniformity denotes predictability,
simpler transactions, and reduced costs. 2 5 5
A bankruptcy system supporting uniformity as a strategic goal would
ensure that most decisions are made at the policy level within the federal
system, in the course of drafting statutes and regulations, which will be ap-
plied uniformly across cases. To the extent that factual inquiries must be
made, decisions should be made at a federal level by individuals with uniform
responsibilities and incentives. These individuals' factual determinations
must be subject to effective and speedy review that would limit the develop-
ment of individualized, non-uniform practices. Where possible, these individ-
uals should be informed by uniform standards that discourage discretionary
departure.
1. Administrative Agency of Bankruptcy
Prior to Stern, it was at least plausible that bankruptcy judges, subject to
closely written laws and discouraged from the exercise of equitable author-
ity,25 6 could successfully meet these criteria. However, as has been observed
by others, in practice, this is not the case.257 Instead, a better method of
achieving uniformity would be to establish a system of federal bankruptcy
administrators, acting within a bankruptcy agency subject to the Administra-
tive Procedure Act ("APA") and guided by close regulation, subject to the
"See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 12, at 934 ('This Article focuses primarily, but not exclusively, on
business bankruptcy.").
252See Warren, supra note 13, at 776-77.
"
3 For example, in 2011, there were 49,895 business bankruptcy filings compared with 1,417,326
nonbusiness filings; business filings comprised only 3% of the total bankruptcy filings. 2011 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 26, at 283 tbl.F-2.
254U.S. CONsT., amend. XIV, § 1.
2"See Lawrence J. Bugge, Commercial Law, Federalism, and the Future, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 11, 18-19
(1992).
"
6Ahart, supra note 200, at 2.
257See Pardo & Watts, supra note 6, at 401-02 (noting that many of the Bankruptcy Code's provisions
are open textured and ambiguous, providing courts with discretion to flesh out details and engage in
policymaking).
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judicial review of Article III federal judges when necessary. Actions outside
of the agency's authority would be reviewed by the appropriate court,
whether federal or state. For reasons of efficiency, explained in greater depth
below,258 certain categories of cases, most probably chapter 11 business reor-
ganizations where the asset amount in controversy was above a certain
threshold, would be administered in the first instance by federal district
courts.
Although strikingly different from how the bankruptcy system is struc-
tured today, use of an executive agency to administer bankruptcy law is not
at all far-fetched. Similar proposals were made at several points in the con-
gressional discussion before and after Marathon, although they have since
been largely forgotten or ignored in the academic literature. For example, in
its 1971 report to Congress, the Brookings Institution recommended essen-
tially this approach, arguing for the establishment of an administrative agency
to handle all cases except reorganizations of corporations. 259 The bankruptcy
system, it argued forcefully, would have shorter deadlines, more streamlined
procedures, and be more effective in accomplishing its administrative func-
tions were it located substantially outside the judicial branch.260
In a similar vein, in response to Marathon, the Judicial Conference pro-
posed that Congress appoint bankruptcy administrators in each judicial dis-
trict to approve routine court filings and grant uncontested motions, but
without authority to resolve disputes among the parties. In addition, as Con-
gress was already tasked with appointing additional district court judges to
meet a rising case load, the Judicial Conference proposed that Congress ap-
point a larger number of district court judges to take on the anticipated in-
creased caseload.261 District court judges assured Congress that they would
be capable of meeting the bankruptcy caseload even after bankruptcy judges
had ceased bearing its weight. 262
Very recently, Rafael Pardo and Kathryn Watts have reached a similar
conclusion on the advisability of an administrative, rather than judicial, sys-
tem of bankruptcy. With an emphasis on the constitutional and policy
2
s.The line demarcating this divide between agency cases and court cases would also need to be
carefully drawn and clearly delineated by Congress, so as to avoid costly and unnecessary jurisdictional
disputes, as well as strategic litigation by non-debtor parties.
2 5 9 DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESs, REFORM 4 (The
Brookings Inst. 1971).
2 mId. at 200 ('The tone of disparagement running through this administrative analysis may surprise or
irritate readers who are accustomed to the operating methods of the judiciary. The bankruptcy system,
however, is in most cases not a genuine judicial enterprise. It is a large-scale example of routine administra-
tive machinery.").
261See Statement of Jonathan C. Rose, supra note 69, at 12.
...See Prepared Statement of Spencer M. Williams, supra note 7, at 34-42 ("1 represent more than 200
district court judges, and I assure you we are not reluctant to handle bankruptcy cases which in fact
require a judge's attention. I assure you we can handle them expeditiously.").
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ramifications of permitting courts to "'fill in the gaps left by broad delega-
tions of power'" in the Bankruptcy Code, 263 they conclude that courts are ill-
equipped to set bankruptcy policy, and that a shift to an administrative
agency with substantive rulemaking powers would be preferable.264
2. Promoting Uniformity
This structure promotes the goal of uniformity for three primary reasons.
First, most routine decisions, such as motions to lift the automatic stay, mo-
tions to avoid non-consensual liens, or disallowance of creditors' claims,
would be determined in the first instance by administrative officials following
closely drafted and carefully monitored regulations. Relatively few of these
types of proceedings raise novel issues, facilitating their disposition by admin-
istrative bodies acting in accordance with a set regulatory script. The bank-
ruptcy agency could respond to cases that do present issues outside the
current regulations with new rules, obtained through notice-and-comment
rulemaking or adjudication 2 65 ensuring that new circumstances receive uni-
form treatment across jurisdictions. In such cases of appellate review of new
rules or policies, interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions would re-
ceive Chevron deference, ensuring more uniform treatment.266
Second, replacing Article I bankruptcy judges with Article III district
court judges in larger cases, often involving more complicated issues, would
shorten the appeals process for bankruptcy cases and reduce uncertainty re-
garding the precedential authority of bankruptcy appeals.267 Under the cur-
rent structure, bankruptcy appeals are rare; few litigants conclude it is in
their interests to attempt an appeal of the bankruptcy judge's ruling and often
the issue is precluded by mootness. 268 When cases are appealed they experi-
ence an extra level of review; appeals in the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits may go to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP), comprised
of three bankruptcy judges, who will review the merits of the case. 2 69 In
26 3Pardo & Watts, supra note 6, at 388 (quoting Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially
Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 405, 408 (2008)).
264Pardo & Watts, supra note 6, at 389.
26 5 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863-64 (1984).
166See Evan J. Criddle, Chevron's Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1291 (2008) ("[B]y committing
ambiguous statutory provisions to executive interpretation, courts reduce the likelihood that circuit splits
will cast a pall of uncertainty over unitary regulatory programs").
567See Bussel, supra note 87, at 1071.
16'The system of bankruptcy appeals and the nature of the underlying substance both provide a strong
disincentive for litigants to do so, as explained by McKenzie, supra note 63, at 782-91. Factors that may
discourage appeals include (1) the level of discretion afforded to bankruptcy judges' rulings by the district
court; (2) the costs of appeal, which must be bourn either by the estate or the creditors; (3) the extra level
of review between the trial court and the court of appeals; (4) uncertainty regarding the precedential merit
of cases passed down from the district court and the bankruptcy appellate panel; and (5) the perceived
aversion of district courts to hearing bankruptcy cases. Id.
269See 28 U.S.C. § 158 (2012). Litigants in these jurisdictions may file an election to transfer their
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other circuits, appeals are heard by federal district judges. 270 Very few cases
make it past this stage to the court of appeals,271 and only a handful in a
decade will make it all the way to the Supreme Court. Accordingly, it is
frequently the case that a bankruptcy judge's decision is final for all intents
and purposes. This dramatically limits precedential authority, resulting in a
greater risk of inconsistent rulings across Circuits and even across districts.272
Even cases which are appealed to the BAP or the district courts hold little
precedential value, and what does exist is subject to uncertain weight.273
Under the structure proposed here, appeals from administrative rulings in
consumer cases and district court rulings in business cases could both be
heard by the Circuit Court in a more direct and streamlined appellate
process.
Third, elimination of a specialized bankruptcy court in favor of a uniform
bankruptcy agency could eliminate or at least reduce specialized bankruptcy
practices, where "local-local" rules can catch those unaccustomed to bank-
ruptcy court practice.274 Many bankruptcy courts have developed the prac-
tice of issuing judicial rules which are both non-uniform and have a significant
effect on parties' substantive rights. 2 75 Trustees have engaged in similar prac-
tices. 2 76 With the development of a single agency overseeing bankruptcy fil-
ings in all fifty states and each individual district, these inconsistences would
cease to exist.
3. Satisfying Stern
This proposed structure resolves the concerns presented by Stern while
simultaneously promoting consistency across federal legal regimes: use of an
administrative agency is standard in many areas of federal law, such as envi-
ronmental and employment actions. The authority of agencies to act in these
case to be heard by the district court rather than the BAP, which is fairly common. In 2011 the opt-out
rate was 37%. 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 117 tbl.B-11 & 171 tbl.C-7. Note that under
the language of § 158(d)(2)(A) it is also theoretically possible for a circuit court of appeals to hear an
appeal from the bankruptcy court in the first instance, if requirements of importance and lack of control-
ling precedent are met.
270See FED. R. BANKR. P. 8013.
27 11n 2010 and 2011, for example, district courts nationwide heard a total of 2,177 and 2,227 appeals,
respectively, and BAP courts 845 and 1,085. 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 280 tbl.F. Of the
3,312 cases appealed in the first instance in 2011, only 683 of these made it to the courts of appeals. Id. at
99 tbl.B-6.
272See Paul M. Baisier & David G. Epstein, Resolving Still Unresolved Issues of Bankruptcy Law: A
Fence or an Ambulance, 69 Am. BANKR. LJ. 525, 527 (1995); Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins,
Alternative Structures for Bankruptcy Appeals, 76 AM. BANKR. LJ. 625, 657 (2002).
273See Bussel, supra note 87, at 1071.
27 4See Daniel A. Austin, Bankruptcy and the Myth of "Uniform Laws", 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1081,
1089 (2012).
27 5See Pardo & Watts, supra note 6, at 437-38 (giving, as an example of conflicting local rules, the
appropriate discount rate in Chapter 13 cases).
276See Austin, supra note 274, at 1106-12.
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spheres is well established. As several have noted, the Supreme Court ap-
pears to have sanctioned an exercise of authority in administrative agencies
that exceeds what is permissible for bankruptcy courts. 2 77
There is no other obvious explanation for the disparity between the Su-
preme Court's ruling in Stern and its holding in Schor.278 The dispute in
Schor centered on the Commodity Exchange Act's grant of authority to the
CFTC to entertain state law counterclaims in reparation proceedings. In
that case, the petitioner challenged the CFTC's statutory authority, and on
review to the D.C. Circuit, the Court of Appeals raised sua sponte the con-
stitutional issue of whether the CFTC could issue binding orders in a tradi-
tional state action under the logic of Marathon.279 The D.C. Circuit
determined that the CFTC lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the com-
mon law counterclaims brought against the petitioner, but avoided the con-
stitutional issue by concluding that the statutory authority was not clearly
expressed.280
In reversing the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court first concluded that the
authority to adjudicate counterclaims was given to the CFTC, as evident on
the face of the statute.281 Further, with regards to the constitutional issue,
the Court concluded that "the magnitude of any intrusion on the Judicial
Branch can only be termed de minimis" in cases where jurisdiction is "limited
to that which is necessary to make the reparations procedure workable."2 8 2
Finally, it noted that a contrary ruling would "'defeat the obvious purpose of
the legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive
method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly
suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency spe-
cially assigned to that task.'"283
277See, e.g., Baird, supra note 76, at 15 ('The kind of counterclaim that was found suspect in Stern is
substantively no different from tort claims that are routinely folded into administrative proceedings in
which the adjudicators do not have life-time tenure. More to the point, it is hard to distinguish the
counterclaim in Stern from the counterclaim the Commodity Future Trading Commission was allowed to
resolve in Schor. If bankruptcy had been located in an administrative agency, the Court in Stern would
have started with a different set of questions."); Elizabeth Gibson, Jury Trials and Core Proceedings: The
Bankruptcy Judge's Uncertain Authority, 65 AM. BANKR. LJ. 143, 176 (1991) (suggesting that Supreme
Court case law indicates "a belief that article III affords Congress greater flexibility to utilize administra-
tive agencies than it does to utilize federal judges who look and act like their article III counterparts but
who lack the constitutionally prescribed job protections"); McKenzie, supra note 19, at 44-45 ("The teach
ing of Stern, apparently, is that the federal judiciary faces more danger of encroachment by the political
branches when the non-Article III adjudicator is a bankruptcy court than when it is an administrative
agency.").







3Id. (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932)).
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The Supreme Court's ruling in Stern, and its efforts to distinguish Schor
and Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products,284 which held that bind-
ing arbitration provisions in the context of environmental administrative law
did not violate Article III, suggest that it is simply more comfortable with
the exercise of adjudicatory authority in agencies than in bankruptcy
courts.2 85 The ability of agencies to issue final, binding rulings in private
disputes has been consistently upheld, while the ability of bankruptcy courts
to do so has been struck down, twice.2 86 To the extent that these agencies
act within constitutional boundaries, the bankruptcy agency would similarly
be protected from constitutional challenges.
4. Anticipated Objections
Like each of the solutions presented above, this solution is not without its
weaknesses. From an ideological standpoint, both proceduralists and tradi-
tionalists are likely to be partially dissatisfied. From the proceduralist per-
spective, differences between creditor treatment at the state and federal level
are still probable. On the one hand, extraneous judicial law making in bank-
ruptcy may be discouraged through drafting more explicit regulations for use
by bankruptcy administrators, and by restricting the types of cases that come
before the federal judge. However, there is nothing in this structure to dis-
courage Congress from using bankruptcy as a policy tool, particularly in the
area of corporate reorganization, where debtors would still have immediate
access to the courts.2 87 Although doing away with specialized bankruptcy
courts would reflect a symbolic step towards a minimalist framework for
bankruptcy, the true test would come in practice.
As for traditionalists, this proposal satisfies the constitutional require-
ments identified in Stern, but diminishes the opportunities for a tailored re-
sponse to individual cases. Bankruptcy administrators will ostensibly be
restrained in their approach to consumer cases and no-asset corporate liquida-
tions by agency regulation. Non-specialized district judges sitting in bank-
ruptcy are likely to be more removed from bankruptcy cases, which will
compete for attention with criminal and civil dockets. Perhaps more to the
point, removing bankruptcy judges deprives the system of a wealth of special-
ized knowledge. Judges who are less comfortable finding their way around
284473 U.S. 568 (1985).
285 McKenzie, supra note 19, at 45 ("The Court's observation, '[w]e deal here not with an agency but
with a court,' expresses unease, and not comfort, about the nature of the forum hearing the estate's
counterclaim.").
28 6Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608, 180 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2011); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982).
287The exercise of equitable authority is also more justifiable in the district court than in current
bankruptcy courts. See Ahart, supra note 200, at 2; see also Levitin, supra note 13, at 4 (citing a federal
interest in uniformity as a justification for federal common lawmaking).
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the Bankruptcy Code will be less able to assist a struggling business or rule
on the equities of any given scenario. This may be beneficial from the per-
spective of proceduralists, who would rather the debtor and creditors negoti-
ate amongst themselves without judicial interference, but it conflicts with
traditionalist goals that depend on an independent arbiter to make distribu-
tional decisions.
i. Impact on System Operations
Perhaps the most immediate response to this proposal is concern that
removing over three hundred judicial officers will destroy the system's opera-
tions; the caseload cannot be managed without the work currently performed
by bankruptcy judges. Any challenge to this position would appear to under-
mine the considerable work that bankruptcy judges do on a daily basis.
However, in a typical uncontested bankruptcy filing under chapter 7, which
comprise the bulk of bankruptcy filings, the bankruptcy judge need not see
the parties involved, review the schedules, or take any part in the discharge.
This suggests that altering procedures, thereby making use of a bankruptcy
administrator who could conduct hearings and make decisions in accordance
with the APA, could result in even fewer cases requiring judicial oversight.
In some cases, where there are assets worth fighting over and controversies
that could potentially delay administration of those assets, resulting in a sig-
nificant loss in value, the district courts could become involved to facilitate
the efficient administration of cases. As a practical matter, virtually all of
these cases will involve reorganization of businesses where there are signifi-
cant assets and accordingly a significant risk of losing value. If there are
enough of these cases to warrant additional federal judges, Congress could
appoint the requisite number. Presumably, the number would be far fewer
than what would be required if existing bankruptcy judges were simply given
Article III status.
In most bankruptcy filings, particularly in the area of consumer bankrupt-
cies, but also occasionally in business liquidations, the invocation of the auto-
matic stay, along with the discharge, may be all that is required for effective
management of the bankruptcy case. Both the stay and the discharge can be
administered by an agency; disputes regarding either may be resolved in
quasi-judicial hearings, common in other agency contexts. 2 88 Other proceed-
ings tangentially necessary to resolve a bankruptcy case may be dealt with at
the state court level, similar to the treatment of plenary actions described
above. These proceedings may suffer from some delay, but as most cases
involve little to no assets, the delay is unlikely to be of significant concern,
"'See generally Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (originally codified at 5
U.S.C. § 556 (1946)).
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outside its immediate effect on the individuals involved.289
ii. Delay and Loss of Value
However, it is generally accepted that speed is necessary in dealing with
some bankruptcy proceedings, both for the debtor's sake and for the credi-
tors', because assets depreciate and interest grows. As potential for loss of
value increases, concerns regarding speed also increase. The greatest poten-
tial for loss of value is in larger business reorganizations, where quick action is
necessary to preserve the value of the business as a going concern.290 Exam-
ples of motions requiring speedy adjudication include "first-day" motions
common in chapter 11 cases for appointment of professionals, use of cash
collateral, and debtor-in-possession financing. The loss of a court dedicated
to the bankruptcy docket could lengthen the expected timeline for disposition
of such proceedings, or even for obtaining a hearing, with potentially disas-
trous results.
Recognizing these concerns, the concept of speed is not foreign to the
district court, which must already grapple with expedited hearings and dead-
lines on the criminal docket. No doubt the federal bench could devise a
means whereby time- sensitive bankruptcy issues could be heard on an expe-
dited basis. A potential solution might be arranging a rotation under which
the "on-call" judge must be prepared at all times to receive emergency mo-
tions in chapter 11 reorganizations. These emergency motions would be nar-
rowly defined as motions dealing with assets above a certain floor,291 in
which delay could result in a dramatic loss of value. In practice, this would
likely mean that only medium to large corporate reorganizations would war-
rant expedited treatment before the district judge. While consumer advo-
cates might object to such a practice as undemocratic and discriminatory, it
responds to the reality that cases involving larger sums usually affect more
people, and accordingly warrant additional consideration.
iii. Loss of Specialization
A primary objection to the solution proposed here, and the most unfortu-
nate casualty of the Stern ruling, would be the loss of highly trained special-
ists in the review of bankruptcy cases; practitioners in particular would likely
object to having district judges otherwise unaccustomed to bankruptcy re-
placing bankruptcy judges who brought years of practical experience to the
bench. Recognizing this loss, and without discounting the benefits of bank-
289Recognition of the impact of delay on individuals is nevertheless important, and the cost of bank-
ruptcy warrants consideration in any proposed bankruptcy system. However, such considerations are
outside the scope of this article.
2901n most other proceedings, delay is to be expected as a matter of debt collection, and is unlikely to
cause significant loss in value absent purposeful bad acts by the debtor.
29 1This floor could mimic the standards for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
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ruptcy judges' expertise to the current system, complexity and close statu-
tory interpretation are familiar challenges to district court judges. These
judges are frequently called upon to rule in areas such as environmental law,
patent law, civil rights, and antitrust. Federal district courts, already tasked
with such complicated areas, should quickly establish a working expertise in
bankruptcy law as they have in other technical areas.
In some respects, this loss of specialization may be viewed as an overall
advantage to the federal system. It can be easily argued that, given the im-
portance of bankruptcy law and its obvious impact on the country's financial
health, commerce, and constituents, a strong familiarity of bankruptcy law
within the general federal bench is long overdue. If bankruptcy is no longer
seen as an exclusively specialized area, more judges, attorneys, and law stu-
dents are likely to acquire a working knowledge of its parameters. 2 92
iv. Impact on Bankruptcy Judge Appointees and Private
Trustees
The counterpoint to the loss of specialization is the reality that, in addi-
tion to destroying current relationships between practitioners and bank-
ruptcy judges, this new structure would also significantly impact sitting
bankruptcy judges. Through no fault of their own, but as a consequence of
the Supreme Court's conclusions regarding the constitutionality of non-Arti-
cle III bankruptcy judges issuing final rulings, under this proposed solution
bankruptcy judges would likely be removed from their positions. 293 Such a
removal, in addition to disrupting the lives of the individual judges, would
also draw administrative costs, such as the need for equitable compensation
for judges' unvested retirement benefits. Private trustees, appointed by the
UST for the purpose of administering cases, particularly in chapter 7 and
chapter 13, would also likely be dismissed to make way for agency
administrators.
Bankruptcy judges and private trustees could likely find places within the
new system, if they chose. Those who desired could likely obtain positions
within the new bankruptcy agency, however, many bankruptcy judges in par-
ticular might blanch at the demotion, both real and perceived, of their author-
292In full disclosure, this is a primary goal of mine in the context of the law school curriculum. Al-
though some subjects touching on bankruptcy, such as secured transactions, are common courses for typi-
cal law students, I have been dismayed to discover that most seem loathe to approach the topic, even
acknowledging its importance in the current economic climate.
293Unfortunately, this is the likely outcome of all proposed structural responses to Stern, although the
traditionalist solution leaves open the possibility (albeit tenuous) that all currently sitting bankruptcy
judges might be promoted to Article III status without question. A more likely scenario would be a
drawn out process of political appointment, through which the less well-connected bankruptcy judges
would likely be removed. This concern was acknowledged by the National Conference of Bankruptcy
Judges early on. See Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress, and the Passage of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978 Part One: Outside Looking In, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 20 (2007).
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ity and influence, particularly when there would be little hope of
administering large asset cases or business reorganizations. 294 Some bank-
ruptcy judges, having lost their positions in the specialized bankruptcy court,
could find positions as newly appointed district court judges. Most individu-
als appointed to the federal bench have some specialization prior to their
appointment; accordingly it should be no disadvantage to would-be appoin-
tees to be trained in what would become a significant portion of the docket -
bankruptcy. This outcome would be highly preferable, as it would also pre-
serve the expertise of former bankruptcy judges within the federal system.
Bankruptcy judges who wished to be appointed as district court judges
would have to face the normal appointment process. Concerns regarding this
process, which also arise for the traditionalists' Article III solution, include
the recognition that it will inevitably introduce a political element to the
bankruptcy appointments process that has not yet been encountered under
the current system. Others have suggested that the current process of ap-
pointing bankruptcy judges may actually result in a higher quality of candi-
dates than would the process of appointing district court judges, because the
appointment of bankruptcy judges is based on merit, rather than political
connections, and selection is made by circuit court judges, rather than Con-
gress.295 Appointment under Article III processes will sacrifice these advan-
tages, to the extent they exist.296
Further, as was made clear during the congressional debate pre- and post-
Marathon, the political ramifications of making hundreds of lifetime appoint-
ments are extensive. Negotiations will need to be made regarding the time-
line for these appointments, and some patronage seems inevitable. Criticism
of the appointments process and recommendations for its restructuring are
outside the scope of this paper, although fertile ground for additional aca-
demic consideration.
Other questions regarding the particularities of the bankruptcy adminis-
trative system are likely to arise, and would need to respond to ongoing con-
cerns regarding efficiency, cost, the potential for agency capture, and political
realities. Despite those questions and the issues raised above, changing the
bankruptcy system from one of specialized courts to one of a specialized
agency is on balance the most preferable response to the Stern problem,
where the system goal or strategy is to promote uniformity, rather than a
distinct distributional policy or consistency with state law.
'
9 4Many consider the business reorganizations to be the most interesting work in bankruptcy practice.
295See McKenzie, supra note 63, at 793; Plank, supra note 15, at 622.
'
9 A move to appointment by the president rather than by circuit courts may be required anyway as a
constitutional matter. For an argument that bankruptcy judges' method of selection violates the Appoint-
ments Clause, see Tuan Samahon, Are Bankruptcy Judges Unconstitutional? An Appointments Clause
Challenge, 60 HASTINGs L.J. 233, 234 (2008).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Restructuring the bankruptcy system appears to be necessary in light of
the jurisdictional crisis originating in the Bankruptcy Code and recently high-
lighted by Stern. Authors have argued for a particular form of restructuring
for over thirty years: the appointment of specialized bankruptcy court judges
under Article III. Although appointment of Article III bankruptcy judges
may be the most obvious solution, being closely aligned with the current
structure and a clear resolution of the Stern dispute, it responds to a particu-
lar set of widely-accepted strategic goals for bankruptcy, and stands in direct
opposition to another widely-accepted strategy. Further, it presupposes that
an Article III specialized court is needed for bankruptcy, despite the fact that
other highly technical and influential areas do not have such specialized fed-
eral courts at the trial level.
Taking a step back and looking at the bankruptcy system from a fresh
perspective permits a restructuring analysis that evaluates proposed solutions
on the basis of their strategic impact. It demonstrates that multiple solutions
are possible. It also points to a solution based on the strategic goal of uni-
formity, the goal most consistent with the constitutional basis for federal
bankruptcy law. The solution is the creation of a bankruptcy agency, relying
on carefully-written regulations, to administer no-asset cases and consumer
bankruptcies. To the extent judicial action is needed, particularly in business
reorganizations, federal judges would exercise jurisdiction directly, without
the initial review of bankruptcy judges. In this way, long-standing concerns
regarding the jurisdictional authority of bankruptcy judges would be re-
solved. Bankruptcy administration would thereafter maintain internal uni-
formity and external consistency within the federal administrative system.
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